Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and Control by Tehranian, John
BYU Law Review
Volume 2012 | Issue 4 Article 3
11-1-2012
Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright,
Consecration, and Control
John Tehranian
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Tehranian, Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, Consecration, and Control, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1233 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2012/iss4/3
 1233 
Towards a Critical IP Theory: Copyright, 
Consecration, and Control 
John Tehranian* 
“All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others.” 
—George Orwell, Animal Farm 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual-property jurisprudence increasingly informs the way 
in which social order is maintained in the twenty-first century. By 
regulating cultural production and patrolling the dissemination of 
knowledge, copyright law mediates the exercise of important social, 
political, and economic rights, thereby playing a critical role in the 
construction of our information society. In theory, ostensibly neutral 
ground rules guide the vesting, enforcement, and adjudication of 
rights pertaining to creative works in a way that best advances the 
constitutionally mandated purpose of the copyright regime: progress 
in the arts.1 But, in reality, copyright law’s procedural and 
substantive doctrines do more than just advance “progress in the 
arts” and can serve as powerful tools for the regulation, control, and 
manipulation of meaning. This Article identifies and builds on an 
emerging literature2—one that it refers to as “critical intellectual-
property” scholarship—to introduce a framework for studying just 
how copyright transcends its small corner of the legal universe by 
shaping social structures and regulating individual behavior as part of 
a larger hegemonic project. 
As John Fiske writes, “Popular culture always is part of power 
relations; it always bears traces of constant struggle between 
domination and subordination, between power and various forms of 
resistance to it or evasions of it . . . .”3 Thus, it is not surprising that 
 
 ∗ AB, Harvard University, JD, Yale Law School. Irwin R. Buchalter Professor of Law, 
Southwestern Law School. Portions of this Article are based on sections of my book, 
Infringement Nation: Copyright 2.0 and You (Oxford University Press, 2011). I would like to 
thank Rose Sélavy and R. Mutt for inspiring the themes in this Article and Joseph Ballstaedt, 
Sarah Swanson, and Michael Worth for their invaluable research and editorial assistance. 
 1. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. See infra Part II.B. 
 3. JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE 19 (Routledge 2d ed. 2010) 
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intellectual-property laws that control access to and use of popular 
culture are a function of power relations. In the early 1970s, 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu introduced the concept of cultural 
reproduction to explain the processes through which the dominant 
class retained its power.4 Drawing on the example of schooling in 
modern society, he argued that educational institutions function 
largely to preserve hegemonic interests by perpetuating the 
reproduction of the cultural and social values of the dominant class.5 
Bourdieu’s work on cultural reproduction has inspired waves of 
scholarship in the social sciences,6 but it has not generated as much 
interest in the field of intellectual property. Yet the notion of cultural 
reproduction is instrumental to understanding the consequences of 
intellectual-property laws on knowledge–power systems. Bourdieu’s 
work and the scholarship it has inspired suggest that the inviolate 
recitation of the cultural production of dominant social forces is a 
profound vehicle for the inculcation of a set of values and symbols 
that consolidate existing power structures.7 If that is the case, the act 
of imperfect reproduction, or of customization, of cultural 
production can translate into an act of subversion or reproduction of 
the existing social order in a particular form. These acts of 
differentiation and similitude, or the acts of imperfect reproduction 
and customization, are carefully regulated by intellectual-property 
laws.8 And the selective protection granted to cultural production 
under the guise of copyright reveals the role of intellectual-property 
law in molding identities, enforcing dominant values, and controlling 
expressive rights. In short, user and creator rights are determined by 
intellectual-property laws that can help both maintain and perpetuate 
existing social structures.9 Copyright’s procedural and substantive 
 
(1989). 
 4. PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, 
SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (Richard Nice trans., 2d ed. 1990) (1970). 
 5. Id. at 56 (referring to a diploma as a “juridically sanctioned validation of the results 
of inculcation”). 
 6. See, e.g., JEN WEBB ET AL., UNDERSTANDING BOURDIEU (2002) (presenting a 
primer on Bourdieu targeting students of sociology and cultural studies). 
 7. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE 
JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1984) (analyzing the social meaning imbued in 
even the most trivial exertions of taste and the role of taste in the construction of identity and 
class differentiation); BOURDIEU & PASSERON, supra note 4, at 56 (analyzing the role of the 
formal educational system in inculcating values and symbols that perpetuate class differences). 
 8. See, for example, the expansive derivative-rights doctrine described infra, note 76 
and accompanying text. 
 9. This is not to suggest that intellectual-property laws inevitably maintain and 
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rules therefore serve as a key vehicle for the discursive exertion of 
knowledge–power systems on individuals. 
Part II of this Article examines the link between intellectual-
property rights and knowledge–power systems. Specifically, it frames 
the theoretical underpinnings of this study of copyright law in 
cultural studies. A growing body of scholarship has begun to analyze 
the relationship between trademark, copyright, and patent doctrines 
and wider power struggles by assessing the myriad ways in which our 
intellectual-property regime reflects and even accentuates traditional 
race-, gender-, orientation-, and class-based divides. Although this 
literature has not received a collective appellation, it has made a vital 
contribution to understanding the broader implications of 
intellectual-property law from a perspective informed, at least 
implicitly, by critical theory. This Article therefore identifies this 
nascent scholarship as developing a ‘critical intellectual-property’ 
theory. This Article then situates this critical intellectual-property 
scholarship in relation to the extant literature in the more mature 
movements of critical legal studies and critical race theory. 
Building on this critical intellectual-property scholarship, this 
Article turns its attention towards constructing a theoretical model 
for assessing the broader impact of intellectual-property protections 
on hegemonic practices. It does so both to elucidate the 
relationships among present contributions in the field and to provide 
a framework for future work. Specifically, this Article recognizes 
three primary moments of analytical interest for critical intellectual-
property queries: (1) the vesting of rights, (2) the assertion of rights, 
and (3) the adjudication of rights. Decision-making in these three 
theaters of operation reveals the intricate way in which ostensibly 
neutral laws have combined to create hierarchies of informational 
and cultural rights that patrol relations between sovereigns and their 
subjects, corporations and individuals, and entrenched interests and 
surging parvenus. 
Thus, Part III focuses on the genesis of rights and the way in 
which the vesting of copyright protection beatifies certain forms of 
cultural production. To illustrate this point and to provide a 
historical analysis of intellectual-property law as a hegemonic 
battleground, the Article examines the origins of the derivative-rights 
doctrine as a response to tensions over access to cultural content. 
 
perpetuate existing social structures. They can also facilitate resistance and counter-hegemonic 
practices. 
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Specifically, the example of William Shakespeare and the opera—
surprisingly populist works in the nineteenth century that 
transformed into the fodder of only the elite in the twentieth 
century—helps trace the development of cultural hierarchy and chart 
the interplay between norms and the law in the process of sacralizing 
creative content. Part III concludes by examining the works of The 
Beatles, as embodied in both the musical Love and Danger Mouse’s 
The Grey Album, to demonstrate how modern copyright law patrols 
acts of cultural reproduction and semiotic disobedience. 
Part IV turns its attention to the assertion of rights. Specifically, 
it examines the power dynamics at play in determining how and 
when rights are enforced and the resulting impact that selective 
enforcement has on the semiotic influence of cultural content. To 
illustrate this point, the Article considers the unauthorized use of 
sound recordings by the federal government at American detention 
facilities at Guantanamo Bay and the conspicuous silence about the 
practice by the music industry. Part IV contrasts this state of affairs 
to the aggressive, high-profile enforcement tactics that the music 
industry has used to fight the scourge of individual file sharing on 
the Internet. In the process, we witness how copyright, and its 
selective enforcement, can mediate the relationship between 
sovereigns and their subjects. 
Finally, Part V focuses on how copyright interests are vindicated 
in the adjudicative process. Specifically, it charts how both the 
procedural and substantive aspects of copyright doctrine create 
hierarchies of protection and impact broader social, economic, and 
political rights. With respect to procedure, copyright’s seemingly 
innocuous registration rules create a vast disparity in the effective 
protections from infringement enjoyed by sophisticated versus non-
sophisticated creators. Thus, procedural niceties reflect and 
perpetuate a broader societal project establishing cultural hierarchy 
and the consecration of sacred texts. With respect to substantive 
adjudication, Part V builds on a body of literature that has 
highlighted the impact that aesthetic judgments have in courts’ 
weighing of copyright claims. Specifically, aesthetic judgments reflect 
subtle, value-laden determinations about the place of creative 
content in our cultural hierarchy. To illustrate this point, an exegesis 
of two recent cases involving unauthorized send-ups of classic 
American novels—Gone with the Wind and The Catcher in the Rye—
demonstrates how courts can abandon a rhetorical commitment to 
aesthetic neutrality in conducting their fair-use analyses and how 
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implicit, but powerful, judgments about a work’s worth—in a 
sociopolitical context—can influence the outcomes of suits. To 
paraphrase George Orwell, while the law may tell us that all 
copyrighted works are created equal, it turns out that some are more 
equal than others. 
II. ANALYZING IP AND POWER 
A. IP as Hegemonic Battleground 
Intellectual property has, for many years, served as a key 
battleground for the struggle between entrenched economic interests 
and emerging competitors. An examination of historical conflicts 
between intellectual-property maximalists and minimalists illustrates 
this point. As Lawrence Lessig has argued, many of the same 
industries that now lobby heavily for strong intellectual-property 
rights established themselves precisely because of their flagrant, 
unauthorized exploitation of the intellectual property of others.10 
Thus, the very entrenched powers now advocating copyright 
maximalism benefitted from brazen infringement during their 
formative years.11 
For more than a century, the fledgling American publishing 
industry reaped handsome economic rewards from the ability to 
reproduce the works of foreign authors—especially those from 
Britain—without paying a penny in royalties.12 Cable television 
blossomed because of retransmission of the signals (i.e., the 
copyrighted content) of the major networks without authorization 
or payment.13 Hollywood became the center of motion-picture 
 
 10. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 
53–64 (2006). 
 11. See infra notes 12–18. 
 12. By and large, works by foreign authors did not enjoy copyright protection in the 
United States from 1790 through 1891. See Seth M. Goldstein, Hitchcock’s “Rear Window” 
and International Copyright Law: An Examination of Stewart v. Abend & Its Effect on 
International Copyright Renewal and Exploitation, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 
258 (2006). 
 13. Niels B. Schaumann, Note, Copyright Protection in the Cable Television Industry: 
Satellite Retransmission and the Passive Carrier Exemption, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 637–40 
(1983). Without this exception, cable television would have had a much harder time gaining 
its foothold in the American living room. Imagine how cable would have fared without 
unauthorized retransmission of network signals: Cable companies could have offered 
consumers a panoply of untested alternatives—a crazy 24/7 news channel, a wacky station that 
played only music videos all day long, a network devoted to b-movies—but it would have 
come without regular networks. And, of course, the cable stations would have been hard 
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universe when Louis Mayer famously travelled to the West Coast to 
seek better weather and to reduce production costs.14 But, less 
famously, Mayer and his cronies were seeking to evade the watchful 
eye of Thomas Edison and his attorneys.15 Edison, it turned out, 
owned numerous patents for technology used by the burgeoning 
film industry, and filmmakers were eager to reduce their production 
costs by not having to license these patent rights.16 In short, 
Hollywood was born of infringement. Major studios such as Walt 
Disney have long profited by drawing upon the rich intellectual 
tradition of folk tales without compensating anyone for their 
exploitation.17 And the modern music industry saw much of its early 
success from the unauthorized exploitation of old blues riffs, many 
stolen directly from unacknowledged African American–folk artists.18 
We continue to see this clash between prior creators and 
emerging innovators in action today. For example, leading Internet 
sites are pushing the line on copyright law as they challenge the 
 
pressed to obtain licenses for retransmission from the major networks as they had no interest in 
fueling their own demise by making the transition to cable all the more palatable. The 
networks wanted cable to come at a cost: you either got the networks or you got the cable 
stations. However, when cable provides the cable stations plus crystal-clear feeds of network 
channels, the temptation of subscribing to cable becomes all the greater, if not irresistible. 
 14. SCOTT EYMAN, LION OF HOLLYWOOD: THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF LOUIS B. 
MAYER 53 (2005). 
 15. Peter Edidin, La-La Land: The Origins, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, at C2 (noting 
that “Los Angeles’s distance from New York was also comforting to independent film 
producers, making it easier for them to avoid being harassed or sued by the Motion Picture 
Patents Company, aka the Trust, which Thomas Edison helped create in 1909”). 
 16. In 1908, Edison and nine other patentees formed the Motion Picture Patents 
Company to pool their intellectual-property rights and effectively control nearly all 
motion-picture technology. The MPCC rigorously enforced its patent rights against 
independent movie producers, bringing infringement claims against any producer not using 
properly licensed equipment. Alexandra Gil, Breaking The Studios: Antitrust and the Motion 
Picture Industry, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 83, 91–92 (2008). 
 17. LESSIG, supra note 10, at 23–24 (“The catalog of Disney work drawing upon the 
work of others is astonishing when set together: Snow White (1937), Fantasia (1940), 
Pinocchio (1940), Dumbo (1941), Bambi (1942), Song of the South (1946), Cinderella 
(1950), Alice in Wonderland (1951), Robin Hood (1952), Peter Pan (1953), Lady and the 
Tramp (1955), Mulan (1998), Sleeping Beauty (1959), 101 Dalmatians (1961), The Sword in 
the Stone (1963), and The Jungle Book (1967).”). 
 18. See, e.g., Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—
LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1598–99 (1997) (“In the 
1950’s, many white artists became superstars either by re-recording black music for white 
audiences, like Pat Boone, or by drawing more indirectly on African-American musical 
traditions, like Elvis Presley. Indeed, the phenomenon called ‘rock ‘n’ roll,’ now associated 
primarily with white artists and white audiences, emerged from the African-American blues 
tradition.”). 
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dominion of entrenched powers. Consider the ongoing showdown 
between Hollywood and Silicon Valley. Web 2.0 outfits such as 
YouTube, Wikipedia, WordPress and Blogger have thrived on the 
exploitation of “user-generated content”—much of which consists of 
either the copyrighted works of third parties or works by users that, 
without authorization, make use of the copyrighted works of third 
parties.19 These third parties are frequently the major movies studios 
and record labels. To date, Web 2.0 companies have shielded 
themselves from liability through the precarious provisions of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) safe harbor provision 
for Internet service providers who host user-generated content;20 but 
those provisions are under attack by traditional-media conglomerates 
such as Viacom, who claim that YouTube illegitimately free rides on 
the backs of content creators whose works provide the value that 
makes YouTube a top online destination.21 The battle has also spilled 
outside of the judiciary and legislature and into the court of public 
opinion. In early 2012, as congressional support for the controversial 
Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) grew, Web 2.0 outfits successfully 
protested the legislation by either shutting down for a day (in the 




SOPA on their front page (in the case of Google).22 SOPA was 
soon dead. 
The resolution of these intellectual-property struggles does not 
simply impact the distribution of private wealth between companies. 
Just as significantly, it also determines the future control of 
 
 19. ROBERT P. LATHAM, JEREMY T. BROWN & CARL C. BUTZER, LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF USER GENERATED CONTENT: YOUTUBE, MYSPACE, FACEBOOK (2012), available at 
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/ 892.pdf  
 20. The DMCA immunizes qualifying Internet services providers from monetary liability 
on claims of contributory infringement when, at the direction of a user, they store material that 
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by them so long as, inter alia, they do 
not have actual knowledge of the infringement, are unaware of facts or circumstances from 
which infringing activity is apparent, and act expeditiously to disable access or remove once 
receiving such knowledge or awareness. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
 21. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010), vacated, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 22. See Declan McCullagh, Wikipedia, Google Blackout Sites to Protest SOPA, CNET 
NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012, 9:43 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57360754-
281/wikipedia-google-blackout-sites-to-protest-sopa. 
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informational and cultural content. In this way, the contours of 
intellectual-property law shape social structures, and jolts to the 
regime can produce fissures along significant fault lines such as race, 
class, gender, and sexual orientation. 
B. Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Critical IP Theory 
In assessing the broader impact of intellectual-property law on 
social structures and issues of race, class, gender, and sexual 
orientation, we draw inspiration from a body of literature in critical 
legal studies and critical race theory. Building on the work of such 
social theorists as Antonio Gramsci,23 Max Weber,24 and Michel 
Foucault,25 the critical-legal-studies movement has explored the link 
between power relationships in society and the development of legal 
doctrine and the structure of legal practice.26 In particular, critical 
 
 23. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO 
GRAMSCI 12, 161, 170, 416–17 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971). 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, grounded in both the consent of the masses and the coercive 
apparatus of the state, has been used by critical legal studies scholars to analyze legal rights and 
legal reasoning. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6 ALSA F. 
32, 32 (1982); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 
1351–52 (“Law . . . embodies and reinforces ideological assumptions about human relations 
that people accept as natural or even immutable.”); Robert Gordon, New Developments in 
Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 286 (David Kairys 
ed., 1982) (“[T]he most effective kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and 
dominated classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is 
satisfactory, or at least represents the most that anyone could expect, because things pretty 
much have to be the way they are.” (citing GRAMSCI, supra, at 195–96, 246–47)). 
 24. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal 
Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western 
Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031 (2004) (positing the strong affiliation between 
Weber’s sociology of law and the tenets of the critical legal studies movement); Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 n.1 
(1983) (noting the particular influence of the social and historical analyses of Marx and Weber 
on many critical legal theorists). 
 25. Foucault’s deconstruction of social discourses, legal or otherwise, in light of 
discursive power relationships has been tremendously influential on critical legal scholarship. 
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Stakes of Law or Hale and Foucault!, in SEXY DRESSING, ETC. 
83 (1993); William P. Alford, On the Limits of “Grand Theory” in Comparative Law, 61 WASH. 
L. REV. 945, 946 (1986) (“The work of Habermas and Foucault, for example, has attracted a 
following among American legal scholars, particularly in and around the critical legal studies 
movement”). 
 26. See, e.g., CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (James Boyle ed., 1992); CRITICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES (Allan C. Hutchinson ed., 1989); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (Peter Fitzpatrick & 
Alan Hunt eds., 1987); CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: ARTICLES, NOTES, AND BOOK REVIEWS 
SELECTED FROM THE PAGES OF THE HARVARD REVIEW (1986); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO 
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL 
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legal theory has questioned claims over the naturalness, objectivity, 
and neutrality of certain legal discourses, including formalism, 
essentialism, and law and economics.27 In so doing, critical legal 
theorists have deconstructed “the role that the myth of ‘neutral law’ 
plays in legitimating legal discourse” and have examined “the way 
that the legal system translates a politically loaded social reality into a 
world of depoliticized operational signs or ideological chimeras.”28 
Critical race theory, which began as a subset of,29 and even 
reaction to,30 the critical legal studies movement, has focused on the 
particular role that law and its institutions have played in both 
maintaining and perpetuating racial subordination.31 In particular, 
 
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Symposium, Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 674 
(1984); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991). 
 27. See James Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Theory and Local Social 
Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 689–90 (1985). 
 28. Id. at 706. 
 29. See, e.g., Angela Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CALIF. L. 
REV. 741, 743 (1994) (“CRT [Critical Race Theory] is the heir to both CLS [Critical Legal 
Studies] and traditional civil rights scholarship.”). 
 30. Among other things, critical race theorists have critiqued the traditional critical legal 
studies movement for not doing enough to focus on systemic issues of race discrimination and 
non-intentional, but nevertheless significant, forms of racial subordination not easily remedied 
by legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical 
Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899–901 (1995). 
 31. See, e.g., STEVEN BENDER, GREASERS AND GRINGOS: LATINOS, LAW, AND THE 
AMERICAN IMAGINATION (2003); ROBERT S. CHANG, DISORIENTED: ASIAN AMERICANS, 
LAW, AND THE NATION-STATE (1999); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS (Dorothy A. Brown ed., 2003); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY 
WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Gary Peller 
& Kendall Thomas eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE 
THEORY (Francisco Valdes, Jerome McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002); RICHARD 
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2001); RACE 
AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (Juan Perea, Richard Delgado, 
Angela Harris & Stephanie Wildman eds., 2000); JOHN TEHRANIAN, WHITEWASHED: 
AMERICA’S INVISIBLE MIDDLE EASTERN MINORITY (2009); THE LATINO/A CONDITION: A 
CRITICAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998); FRANK H. WU, YELLOW: 
RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE (2002); Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of 
Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996); Robert S. Chang, 
Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and 
Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241 (1993); Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind 
Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent Writings About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 121 (2003); 
Cheryl I. Harris, Critical Race Studies: An Introduction, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1215 (2002); 
Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993); Tanya Kateri 
Hernandez, “Multiracial” Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind 
Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: 
Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261 
(1997). 
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critical race theorists have explored the ways in which the trope of 
colorblindness and ostensibly neutral ordering rules have “not only 
allowed law to ignore the social and institutional structures of 
oppression created historically and recreated presently in law and 
practice” but also have “blunted efforts to dismantle the racial caste 
system.”32 Take the debate over the regulation of hate speech, for 
example. Channeling the provocative arguments of Charles 
Lawrence and Mari Matsude, Derrick Bell has noted that  
being committed to “free speech” may seem like a neutral 
principle, but it is not. Thus, proclaiming that “I am committed 
equally to allowing free speech for the KKK and 2LiveCrew” is a 
non-neutral value judgment, one that asserts that the freedom to 
say hateful things is more important than the freedom to be free 
from the victimization, stigma, and humiliation that hate speech 
entails.33  
Critical race theorists have therefore identified and critiqued 
systemic features of our legal system that may contribute to the 
disenfranchisement of communities of color.34 
In recent years, a new body of intellectual-property literature has 
emerged, imbued with the spirit of critical legal studies and critical 
race theory. Scholars have begun to explore the relationship between 
gender and intellectual property,35 examining such issues as the 
gendered aspects of copyright’s fair-use doctrine,36 the tension 
 
 32. Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race 
Theory, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336 (2006). 
 33. Bell, supra note 30, at 902 (citing Charles R. Lawrence, III, If He Hollers Let Him 
Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (1990); Mari J. Matsuda, 
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 
(1989)). 
 34. Id. at 900. 
 35. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 183, 185 (2006) (highlighting the role that feminist theory can play 
in revealing how “the dualism of mind and body that pervades both patent and copyright law” 
can “determine[] and maintain[] a pervasive set of power relationships in society”); Madhavi 
Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J. GENDER RACE & 
JUST. 69, 70 (2000). 
 36. Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551, 552, 559–64 (2006) (“Many of the professionally 
prominent, active legal scholars in the intellectual-property subject areas, those whose 
publications obtain high numbers of citations and receive the most numerous and prestigious 
speaking engagements (citations and conference invitations being important metrics for 
gauging reputation and prestige), do not explicitly address issues of gender, race, or economic 
class in their scholarship very frequently”). 
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between feminism and the expansive scope of copyrightable and 
patentable subject matter,37 and the role of copyright law in 
dissuading “non-hierarchical, associative webs” critical to feminist 
discourse.38 Similarly, scholars have examined the complex interface 
between intellectual-property laws and race in assessing, for example, 
the role of copyright rules in legitimating the unacknowledged and 
uncompensated usurpation of traditional African American–folk and 
blues in the development of the modern music industry.39 More 
broadly, research within the field has addressed the relationship 
between intellectual property and sexual orientation40 and the impact 
of intellectual-property regimes on global inequalities.41 
While this particular body of intellectual-property research has 
not acquired a collective appellation, it shares a common 
methodology and inquisitive approach. For lack of a better term and 
in recognition of its philosophical roots, I refer to this body of work 
 
 37. Malla Pollack, Towards a Feminist Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the 
Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightable and Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 603, 605 (2006) (“This article’s core claim is that the public domain is 
inherently feminist, especially for those who recognize that ‘both women and men are 
oppressed by the “sex role system”’ of western capitalism. By enlarging and protecting the 
public domain, society would move towards a more feminine, and therefore more humanist, 
culture.” (quoting ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMENIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 8 (1983)). 
 38. Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 519, 519 (2006) (addressing the conflict between our existing copyright law and 
feminist conceptions of hypertext). 
 39. See, e.g., SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 117–48 (2001) (tracing the 
appropriation of blues by rock ‘n’ roll artists over time); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. 
Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 
550–51 (2006); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over 
African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1193 (2008) (“The 
fleecing of Black artists was the basis of the success of the American music industry . . . .”); K.J. 
Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 339, 358–59 (1999); K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection 
of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER. SOC. POL’Y & L. 365, 371–
74 (2008). 
 40. Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the 
Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 187, 223 (2005) (documenting and challenging how existing “neutral” trademark 
rules have been utilized to deny intellectual-property protection to “queer marks”). 
 41. Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, 
Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, “Global” Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 461–64 (1998) (discussing how the seemingly neutral 
harmonization of intellectual-property standards has profound North-South implications); 
Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
1331, 1354 (2004) (cautioning that the trope of a “romantic public domain” can relegate 
forms of traditional knowledge to the commons and thereby exacerbate global inequities). 
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as “critical IP theory,” which I loosely define as the deconstruction 
of trademark, copyright, and patent laws and norms in light of 
existing power relationships to better understand the role of 
intellectual property in both maintaining and perpetuating social 
hierarchy and subordination. Drawing on this growing body of 
critical IP literature, this Article assesses the role of copyright law in 
creating hierarchies of work entitled to differing levels of protection 
and the hegemonic consequences of these hierarchies on societal 
knowledge–power systems. 
Copyright law represents a key battleground in power relations, 
especially in the twenty-first century, as various societal actors 
struggle for the rights to control, regulate, or manipulate cultural 
content. Old industries use intellectual-property enforcement to 
resist competition from start-ups.42 Sovereigns benefit from 
intellectual-property exemptions (both de facto and de jure) that 
enable their free use and reinterpretation of cultural content.43 And 
corporations rely on intellectual-property rights to attempt to 
consecrate their cultural content.44 However, not all cultural content 
is treated the same way, and the particular structure of copyright law 
in doling out differing levels of protection to creative works 
represents a key aspect of broader domination and subordination 
practices. Under our copyright regime, some works become 
beautified as sacred texts while others remain subject to 
unadulterated manipulation and reinterpretation. And as we shall 
 
 42. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the dynamics of the litigation 
between traditional media conglomerate Viacom and Web 2.0 outfit YouTube). 
 43. See infra Part IV.A (noting the absence of copyright enforcement against the federal 
government for its unauthorized public performance of musical compositions at the military 
base at Guantanamo Bay and the resulting recoding of songs such as “Born in the U.S.A.”). 
On the de jure side of the equation, consider the sovereign immunity granted to states on 
claims of copyright infringement. See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601, 607–
08 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting, as unconstitutional, Congress’s Copyright Remedy Clarification 
Act (“CRCA”), which sought to hold states liable for acts of copyright infringement); Romero 
v. Cal. Dep’t of Transp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23193, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2009) 
(same); Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of the Cal. State Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 
1088, 1094–95 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (same). 
 44. Mattel, for example, is notorious for its aggressive attempts to use intellectual-
property litigation to prevent unauthorized artistic reinterpretations of Barbie. See, e.g., Mattel, 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 816 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Mattel’s 
claims of copyright, trademark, and trade dress infringement against artist Thomas Forsythe for 
his photographs portraying a sexualized, naked Barbie in absurd positions with vintage 
household appliances); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906–07 (9th Cir. 
2002) (rejecting Mattel’s claims that Aqua’s pop hit Barbie Girl—which lampooned the 
famous doll—infringed and diluted the “Barbie” trademark). 
1233 Copyright, Consecration, and Control 
 1245 
see, this process occurs in at least three primary moments of 
analytical interest: (1) the vesting of rights, (2) the assertion of 
rights, and (3) the adjudication of rights. 
III. THE VESTING OF RIGHTS 
A. Derivative-Rights Protection and the Emergence of Cultural 
Distinction: Highbrow/Lowbrow Norms and the Remix of Art 
The process of creating rights represents an instrumental part of 
a wider historical project driving the protection of elite culture and 
the regulation of social boundaries. To illustrate this process, we 
contemplate the interaction of norms and law in the vesting of 
derivative-rights protection to copyright owners. In the early years of 
the Republic, copyright law simply forbade the literal reproduction 
of protected works, in toto, without authorization.45 The subject 
matter of copyright was limited to books, charts, and maps.46 And, 
quite notably, transformative (derivative) uses of copyrighted works 
were deemed to be, per se, non-infringing.47 As a result, even the 
unauthorized act of abridgement or translation of a copyrighted 
work was considered permissible.48 The limited nature of the 
copyright monopoly enabled the types of activities that characterized 
American cultural scene in the early- and mid-nineteenth century: 
the frequent reinterpretation, remixing, transformation, parody, 
embellishment, abridgement, adaptation, and alteration of a panoply 
of works that now form the inviolable canon.49 Over time, this 
 
 45. See, e.g., John Tehranian, Et Tu, Fair Use? The Triumph of Natural-Law Copyright, 
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 465, 466 (2005) (“[E]arly copyright laws prohibited slavish copying of 
a protected work . . . .”). 
 46. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831). 
 47. Tehranian, supra note 45, at 474–80. 
 48. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 652 (1834) (“An abridgement 
fairly done, is itself authorship, requires mind; and is not an infringement, no more than 
another work on the same subject.”); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 207 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1853) (No. 13,514) (“To make a good translation of a work, often requires more learning, 
talent and judgment, than was required to write the original. Many can transfer from one 
language to another, but few can translate. To call the translations of an author’s ideas and 
conceptions into another language, a copy of his book, would be an abuse of terms, and 
arbitrary judicial legislation.”); Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) 
(No. 13,497) (“A fair abridgment of any book is considered a new work, as to write it requires 
labor and exercise of judgment”). 
 49. See infra notes 51–68 and accompanying text (discussing the widespread remixing 
and reinterpretation of Shakespeare, opera, and symphonic music in nineteenth century 
America). 
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changed with the introduction of the derivative-rights protection.50 
The establishment of this right as part of the firmament of modern 
copyright law illuminates the copyright’s role in preserving elite 
culture and regulating social boundaries. 
We begin our analysis by focusing on the works of William 
Shakespeare—a man whose works never enjoyed copyright 
protection but whose oeuvre is firmly entrenched at the pinnacle of 
our cultural hierarchy. And we start with a simple observation about 
his poetry and prose: although it has long been part of the firmament 
of a sacred Western canon, this was not always the case. As much as 
it may surprise contemporary observers, the bard’s works enjoyed a 
radically different cultural standing during the nineteenth century, 
when his plays were widely disseminated and enjoyed by a wide 
swath of American society.51 
In his book, Highbrow/Lowbrow, Lawrence Levine documents 
the ubiquity of Shakespeare in the early popular culture of the 
Republic and charts the evolving position of Shakespearean works in 
American life over the course of the past century.52 As it turns out, 
during the nineteenth century, the bard’s works were the very 
definition of popular, not elite, entertainment.53 Shakespeare’s plays 
were not only performed in venues throughout our country but his 
characters and plotlines were frequently the subject of minstrel 
parodies, abridgements, and re-interpretations, intermingled with 
popular songs, farces, novelty acts, and dances.54 In the absence of 
any consecrating ethos,55 his works were free to be manipulated and 
altered so that they might appeal to audiences of all stripes, playing 
in venues ranging from working-class burlesque and vaudeville shows 
along the frontier to the Brahman’s East Coast theater.56 Therefore, 
Shakespeare played a central role in entertaining the American 
masses. As a German observer from the era put it, one could always 
 
 50. Tehranian, supra note 45, at 489–91 (documenting the historical emergence of the 
derivative-rights doctrine as an outcome of natural-law copyright sensibilities and noting its 
role in controlling the remix and reinterpretation of creative works). 
 51. LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, HIGHBROW/LOWBROW: THE EMERGENCE OF CULTURAL 
HIERARCHY IN AMERICA 16–17 (1988) (discussing how, during the nineteenth century, 
Shakespeare was “presented and recognized almost everywhere in the country”). 
 52. See generally id. 
 53. Id. at 31. 
 54. Id. at 14–16. 
 55. Of course, it was not just norms that supported such uses of Shakespeare. An 
absence of legal prohibitions also encouraged remixing activities. 
 56. See generally LEVINE, supra note 51, at 17–20. 
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count on Shakespeare taking his rightful place alongside the Bible in 
the American home: 
There is, assuredly, no other country on earth in which Shakespeare 
and the Bible are held in such general high esteem as in America, 
the very country so much decried for its lust for money. If you were 
to enter an isolated log cabin in the Far West and even if its 
inhabitant were to exhibit many of the traces of backwoods living, 
he will most likely have one small room nicely furnished in which 
to spend his few leisure hours and in which you will certainly find 
the Bible and in most cases also some cheap edition of the works of 
the poet Shakespeare.57 
Near the fin de siècle, however, views changed dramatically, and 
the works of Shakespeare increasingly came under the exclusive 
dominion of the elite and formally educated.58 Although a number 
of demographic, gustatory, linguistic, and social trends partly explain 
this transformation,59 Levine identifies another key driving force: the 
emergence of two distinct and mutually exclusive categories of 
cultural content—highbrow and lowbrow.60 The bifurcation 
between these two types of works was policed through a sacralization 
process that separated the populist from the patriciate. Specifically, a 
beatifying ethos emerged, permeating works at the top of the 
hierarchy with an air of untouchability.61 Works were consecrated 
into a single “authentic” form, which could not be modified or 
reinterpreted.62 Notes Levine, “By the turn of the century 
Shakespeare has been converted from a popular playwright whose 
dramas were the property of those who flocked to see them, into a 
sacred author who had to be protected from ignorant audiences and 
overbearing actors threatening the integrity of his creations.”63 For 
example, unlike the days of yore when transformations, 
abridgements, and adaptations were encouraged, “actors were 
admonished not to take liberties with the text of a Shakespearean 
play.”64 The malleable, populist Shakespeare gave way to an 
embalmed, sacred version characterized by inviolability. 
 
 57. Id. at 18. 
 58. Id. at 72. 
 59. Id. at 49. 
 60. See generally id. 
 61. Id. at 72. 
 62. Id. at 138. 
 63. Id. at 72. 
 64. Id. at 138. 
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The transformation in Shakespeare during the era was not 
unique. Similar changes occurred in opera, symphonic music, and 
the fine arts as they joined the ranks of elite culture.65 As Katherine 
Preston’s research on nineteenth-century opera reveals, troupes 
performed extensively in both English and Italian to large audiences 
throughout antebellum America.66 Explains Levine, “Opera in 
America, like Shakespeare in America, was not presented as a sacred 
text; it was performed by artists who felt free to embellish and alter, 
add and subtract.”67 However, opera’s sacralization placed the genre 
in the exclusive province of the elite.68 An unrepentant attack against 
adulteration of canonized works is, of course, a key hallmark of the 
consecration process. The remixing of Shakespeare, opera, and 
symphonic music—accepted practice in the nineteenth century—had 
become verboten. 
B. Sacralization in the Late Nineteenth Century: Towards a 
Derivative-Rights Doctrine 
There is no mention of copyright law in Levine’s seminal study, 
and, in this respect, Levine is not alone. Broadly speaking, and 
probably due to the phenomenon of academic Balkanization, the 
question of intellectual-property rights is widely underappreciated in 
the literature of cultural studies. However, copyright protection lies 
at the heart of the discursive struggle to police cultural hierarchy, to 
beatify sacred texts, and to proscribe their unwanted embellishment, 
abridgement, transformation, manipulation, and alteration. For 
example, and not coincidentally, at the very moment when Levine 
documents the emergence of a cultural rift between highbrow and 
lowbrow content, copyright protections expanded in an especially 
salient manner. Specifically, copyright holders began to enjoy a 
power previously denied them: the exclusive right to prepare 
 
 65. For example, as symphonic music made the transition from mainstream to 
highbrow, “the masterworks of the classic composers were to be performed in their entirety by 
highly trained musicians on programs free from the contamination of lesser works or lesser 
genres, free from the interference of audience or performer, free from the distractions of the 
mundane; audiences were to approach the masters and their works with proper respect and 
proper seriousness, for aesthetic and spiritual elevation rather than mere entertainment.” Id. at 
146. 
 66. KATHERINE K. PRESTON, OPERA ON THE ROAD: TRAVELLING OPERA TROUPES IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1825–60, at 59, 116, 141 (1993); see also LEVINE, supra note 51, at 88. 
 67. LEVINE, supra note 51, at 89–90. 
 68. Id. at 101. 
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derivative versions of their copyrighted works. 
Under the 1831 Copyright Act (as with the 1790 Copyright Act 
and the Statute of Anne before it), a copyright holder only possessed 
“the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, and 
vending” a work.69 In short, there was no derivative-rights 
protection extended to copyright holders. As a result, the sacred 
text—outside of religion, where norms demanded it—did not exist 
as we know it. Celebrated works remained dynamic, ever-changing, 
and responsive to the particular needs of diverse audiences. In the 
nineteenth century, the elite cultural pursuits of modern times—such 
as Shakespeare, opera, fine art, and symphonic music—were equally 
as popular with the proletariat and the patriciate.70 
As Levine documents, the emerging fetishization of sacred texts 
in the late nineteenth century played an instrumental role in the 
creation and crystallization of cultural hierarchy.71 Simultaneously, 
copyright doctrine transformed, thereby both reflecting and reifying 
these changing cultural attitudes and giving legal bite to the 
hallowing process. When norms depressed efforts to bastardize the 
“authentic” language, plots, characters, and themes of Shakespeare’s 
works, copyright provided juridical force to the protection of works 
from rampant popular manipulation and reinterpretation.72 In 1870, 
Congress overturned existing case law and amended the Copyright 
Act of 1831 to secure for copyright holders the exclusive rights to 
translate and dramatize their works.73 The 1909 Copyright Act went 
even further, granting such derivative rights as novelization and 
musicalization exclusively to copyright holders.74 Finally, the 1976 
 
 69. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436 (1831) (current version at 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). 
 70. LEVINE, supra note 51, at 4, 21, 34, 85 & 100. 
 71. Id. at 72–74 (“The human Shakespeare who existed for most of the nineteenth 
century could be parodied with pleasure and impunity; the sacred Shakespeare who displaced 
him at its close posed greater problems.”); id. at 104 (“[T]he operate house [became] less a 
center of entertainment than a sacred source of cultural enlightenment.”). 
 72. Of course, with Shakespeare in the public domain, anyone can make use of his works 
and bastardize the language, plots, characters, and themes in any way one wants. But norms 
depressed such activity, thereby leading to Shakespeare’s eventual transition from the peoples’ 
playwright to a leading symbol of highbrow culture. Copyright law achieves the same function 
as those prior norms by interdicting the mongrelization of protected works. 
 73. Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (current version at 17 
U.S.C. § 101 (2012)) (“[A]uthors may reserve the right to dramatize or to translate their own 
works”). 
 74. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 1, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (current version at 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)). The Act gave authors the exclusive right to “translate the 
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Copyright Act explicitly gave authors the exclusive right to prepare 
all derivatives of their copyrighted works75 and provided an expansive 
definition of what constituted a derivative work.76 Though motivated 
by a variety of factors, including changing social norms, rather than a 
singular congressional commitment to sacralization, the emergence  
 
 
of the modern derivative-rights doctrine in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries secured the Benjamanian “aura”77 of works. 
With the sacralization process in full force, it is not surprising 
that this era witnessed the counteractive rise of several subversive art 
movements. Cultural hierarchy spawned its discontents in the form 
of fine art movements such as Dadaism, futurism, fauvism, and 
surrealism,78 with the various art schools launching a broadside 
attack against the very notion of sacred texts, undermining existing 
perceptions of high art with ready-mades, collage, photomontage, 
assemblage, and automatic drawing.79 For example, Marcel 
Duchamp’s infamous L.H.O.O.Q. seemingly performed the ultimate 
sacrilege by mutilating Leonardo da Vinci’s hallowed Mona Lisa with 
 
copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or make any other version thereof, if it be a 
literary work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a novel or other 
nondramatic work if it be a drama; to arrange or adapt it if it be a musical work; to complete, 
execute, and finish it if it be a model or design for a work of art.” See id. § 1(b). 
 75. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). 
 76. Under the current 1976 Copyright Act, a derivative work is 
a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical 
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound 
recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which 
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial 
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, 
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work.” 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 77. See Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproductions, in 
ILLUMINATIONS 224 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1968) (arguing that, in an age 
of mechanical reproduction, the ease of replicating creative works threatens art’s aura—its 
perceived authenticity and ritualistic value); see also John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No 
Copyright: Registration, Cultural Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright Militancy, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1399, 1401–02 (2009) (discussing the role of copyright law in 
preserving and creating cultural hierarchy and, therefore, protecting the Benjaminian aura of 
certain cultural production). 
 78. This is not to say that the movements themselves were not highly elitist in their own 
way. 
 79. See, e.g., ANDRÉ BRETON, MANIFESTOS OF SURREALISM (1969); Tristan Tzara, 
Dadaist Manifesto, in SEVEN DADA MANIFESTOS AND LAMPISTERIES (Barbara Wright trans., 
Calder Publications ed. 1977) (1919). 
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a moustache, goatee, and a tawdry new title to boot.80 Duchamp’s 
own masterpiece, the ready-made Fountain, annihilated the 
distinction between highbrow and lowbrow by bringing the urinal to 
the museum.81 
Though the Dadaists and surrealists rarely discussed copyright 
per se, their core ideas were imbued with their relationship to the 
concept of intellectual property. Specifically, they rejected notions of 
originality and authorial genius and challenged the rights of 
exclusion that might go with such constructs. As the enigmatic and 
self-styled Comte de Lautréamont, a leading influence on the 
surrealists, argued, “Plagiarism is necessary. It is implied in the idea 
of progress. It clasps the author’s sentence tight, uses his expressions, 
eliminates a false idea, and replaces it with the right idea.”82 On this 
basis, Lautréamont freely “borrowed” from the works of Pascal, 
Kant, La Fontaine, and others in making his own.83 As Anna Nimus 
observes, Lautréamont’s view “subverted the myth of individual 
creativity, which was used to justify property relations in the name of 
progress when it actually impeded progress by privatizing culture. 
The natural response was to reappropriate culture as a sphere of 
collective production without acknowledging artificial enclosures of 
authorship.”84 Thus, Lautréamont’s mantra “became a benchmark 
for the 20th century avant-gardes. Dada rejected originality and 
portrayed all artistic production as recycling and reassembling—from 
Duchamp’s ready-mades, to Tzara’s rule for making poems from cut-
up newspapers, to the photomontages of Hoech, Hausmann and 
Heartfield.”85 In short, Dadaists, surrealists, and others members of 
the avant-garde fervently challenged the sanctity of sacred texts, 
freely creating unauthorized derivative works in defiance of the new 
social norms and laws that gave such rights exclusively to copyright 
holders. 
During the intervening decades, the Dadaists and surrealists have 
 
 80. See Marcel Duchamp, L.H.O.O.Q. (altered reproduction) (1919), available at 
http://www.marcelduchamp.net/L.H.O.O.Q.php. 
 81. See Marcel Duchamp (as R. Mutt), Fountain (readymade) (1917), available at 
http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-fountain-t07573. 
 82. ISIDORE DUCASSE, POÉSIES 15 (1870), available at www.gutenberg.net. 
 83. JULIA KRISTEVA, THE SENSE AND NON-SENSE OF REVOLT: THE POWERS AND 
LIMITS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 110-11 (Jeanine Herman trans., 2001). 
 84. Anna Nimus, Copyright, Copyleft and the Creative Anticommons, SUBSOL, 
http://subsol.c3.hu/subsol_2/contributors0/nimustext.html (last visited July 26, 2012). 
 85. Id. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1252 
been recaptured by the elite (if they were ever outside of the elite in 
the first place). Their works feature prominently in museum 
exhibitions worldwide and enjoy renown among the cognoscenti. 
But they were not co-opted. Their revolutionary influence continues 
to be felt, as they have forced a pronounced change in elite culture: 
their attack on the highbrow/lowbrow distinction has gained 
traction, and our modern notion of cultural literacy has grown more 
inclusive and pluralistic as a result. For example, E.D. Hirsch’s 1987 
bestseller, Cultural Literacy, does not simply include knowledge of 
Shakespeare, Dante, Mozart, and Longfellow as required elements of 
cultural literacy; Disney, The Beatles, the Marx Brothers, and King 
Kong all find a place on his list as well.86 Yet this changing 
perception of cultural literary has also supported the sacralization of 
a wider swath of cultural production—specifically, popular works 
with significant economic value. 
Copyright law continues to reify cultural stratification by 
supporting the notion of sacred texts. Although such texts may now 
come from The Beatles instead of Shakespeare, hierarchy remains in 
place, albeit with different content. Take the example of John 
Lennon, Paul McCartney, George Harrison, and Ringo Starr’s 
musical compositions. Their works are consecrated and untouchable. 
However, this inviolability is not driven by norms (as it may have 
been in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) but, rather, 
by copyright law. And just as avant-garde artists challenged norms of 
inviolability in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, their 
intellectual heirs today challenge the growing scope of copyright 
protection. 
C. Love and Law: A Modern Example 
Changing copyright protections therefore served evolving 
cultural norms and the sacralization project, a process that continues 
to take place when rights holders and users of creative content clash. 
Take, for example, the Love project, released by The Beatles in 
2006.87 A Grammy Award-winning soundtrack compilation album 
and a Cirque du Soleil show playing exclusively in Las Vegas, Love 
featured an innovative remixing and reinterpretation of 
 
 86. E.D. HIRSCH, CULTURAL LITERACY: WHAT EVERY AMERICAN NEEDS TO KNOW 
146 (1987); LEVINE, supra note 51, at 248. 
 87. THE BEATLES, LOVE (Apple Records 2006). 
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approximately 130 different recordings by the band.88 Yet it was not 
without its critics. While giving the soundtrack an “A,” 
Entertainment Weekly commented that the album “flirts with heresy 
by remixing and remodeling the most sacrosanct pop canon of the 
20th century” but that “[y]ou could figure it as a sop to today’s 
interactive mash-up culture.”89 
In All Together Now, the documentary that follows the creation 
of the Love show and soundtrack, Paul McCartney waxes eloquent 
about the majestic and transformative nature of the remixes in Love 
and how they allow listeners to experience The Beatles in an entirely 
new manner.90 In an ostensible nod to musical democracy, he rejects 
calls of heresy, noting that audiences can always play the group’s old 
albums if they want to hear the original songs in their unadulterated 
form.91 McCartney’s view of Love is entirely laudatory, as he takes 
pains to convey that the project allows audiences to re-examine and 
reinterpret The Beatles in a provocative and meaningful way. 
Notwithstanding McCartney’s words, however, one cannot help 
but question the depths of his sentiments. After all, he does not 
appear ready to open the marketplace to others who might be 
capable of taking The Beatles oeuvre in innovative and expressive 
directions—far from it, in fact, as only two people in the world, 
trusted producer George Martin and his son Giles, were given the 
sole right to engage in such a remarkable reinterpretive journey with 
the works of The Beatles.92 And while the project had no direct 
involvement from either of the surviving Beatles, Paul and Ringo,93 it 
did require a smidgeon of vital input: approval. Because of the 
exclusive rights secured under the Copyright Act, the ability to 
conduct a remix depended entirely on receiving permission from 
Paul McCartney, Ringo Starr, Yoko Ono, and Olivia Harrison.94 
Moreover, if anyone besides the Martins had attempted the feat, he 
or she would have faced a multimillion-dollar lawsuit for the 
 
 88. ALL TOGETHER NOW (Apple Corps Ltd./Cirque du Soleil, 2008) (documentary 
about the making of the Love project). 
 89. Chris Willman, Peace, ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY (Nov. 17, 2006) (review of Love), 
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,1560886,00.html. 
 90. ALL TOGETHER NOW, supra note 88. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012) (granting copyright holders the exclusive right to 
authorize derivatives based on their protected work(s)). 
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unauthorized creation of a derivative work. 
Witness the response to the wildly popular The Grey Album, 
which preceded Love by two years. A mash-up by Danger Mouse that 
remixed Jay-Z’s The Black Album with numerous samples from The 
White Album by The Beatles, The Grey Album was motivated by the 
same creative and artistic spirit purportedly fueling Love. According 
to many observers, it succeeded brilliantly. Among other things, the 
work was named by Entertainment Weekly as the Top Album of 
2004.95 However, unlike Love, The Grey Album’s very existence was 
illegal,96 if not criminal.97 Music label EMI, acting with the apparent 
blessing of The Beatles, responded not with love, but rather with 
law. Attorneys attempted to wipe the recording out of existence by 
serving online distributors with the usual stream of cease-and-desist 
letters threatening infringement litigation.98 And although there are 
pockets of the Internet where you can still download copies of The 
Grey Album, you will never find it mass distributed at retail stores. 
With the tools of copyright law put to use, sacred works can 
remain relatively inviolable, subject only to reinterpretation when the 
masters themselves deem a project worthy (artistically, monetarily, or 
otherwise). In other words, the sacred work is shielded from the 
open marketplace through the derivative-rights doctrine that forbids 
mongrelization in all forms.99 As Max Weber once noted, 
stratification or status order comes to being when certain ideals, 
material goods, or opportunities are “directly withh[e]ld from free 
exchange by monopolization, which may be effected either legally or 
conventionally.”100 This observation applies with force to the state-
granted monopoly that is intellectual property. Comments Levine, 
 
 95. Cory Doctorow, EW Picks Grey Album for Best of 2004, BOINGBOING.NET (Dec. 28, 
2004, 11:23 PM), http://boingboing.net/2004/12/28/ew-picks-grey-album-.html. 
 96. As scholar Jonathan Zittrain observed, 
As a matter of pure legal doctrine, the Grey Tuesday protest is breaking the law, end 
of story. But copyright law was written with a particular form of industry in mind. 
The flourishing of information technology gives amateurs and homerecording artists 
powerful tools to build and share interesting, transformative, and socially valuable 
art drawn from pieces of popular cultures. There’s no place to plug such an 
important cultural sea change into the current legal regime. 
MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND CONSUMER REVOLUTION 134 (2007). 
 97. See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (providing for criminal penalties for certain forms 
of willful copyright infringement). 
 98. See Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED (Feb. 14, 2004), 
http://www.wired.com/entertainment/music/news/2004/02/62276. 
 99. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012); see also supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 100. MAX WEBER, ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 93 (Richard Swedberg ed., 1999). 
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When Shakespeare, opera, art, and music were subject to free 
exchange, as they had been for much of the nineteenth century, 
they became the property of many groups, the companion of a 
wide spectrum of other cultural genres, and thus their power to 
bestow distinction was diminished, as was their power to please 
those who insisted on enjoying them in privileged circumstances, 
free from the interference of other cultural groups and the dilution 
of other cultural forms.101 
But when taboos emerge—whether based on the emergence of a 
new set of norms or the expanding scope of copyright law—works 
remain intentionally unadulterated, consecrated in a static state that 
perpetuates their elite status. 
The power of The Beatles and their business partners to control 
the destiny (and maintain the “aura”) of their musical compositions 
for a lifetime plus seventy years is, of course, a product of the 
copyright system.102 In the context of sampling sound recordings, 
courts have been especially enthusiastic about protecting rights 
holders against unauthorized users. In so doing, they have chosen to 
deny any semblance of a fair-use defense to litigants using sound 
recordings without authorization, no matter how trivial or 
transformative the use. For example, the first reported decision to 
consider the legality of sampling elected to resolve the issue by 
quoting Exodus and sophistically equating the Seventh 
Commandment with the law of copyright.103 “Thou shalt not steal,” 
the court tersely warned.104 More recently, a federal circuit court 
addressing the same question left God out of the equation but 
remained equally blunt when it cautioned: “Get a license or do not 
sample.”105 In the process, the court held that any unauthorized 
sample of a sound recording, no matter how small, constituted 
copyright infringement, regardless of any fair-use defense.106 
 
 101. LEVINE, supra note 51, at 230. 
 102. Works created after January 1, 1978 enjoy copyright protection for the lifetime of 
the last surviving author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)–(b). Of course, however, 
musical compositions by The Beatles were written before January 1, 1978. As a result, they are 
protected for 95 years from their date of creation under American law. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)(2) 
(2012) (granting an additional 67 year term to works in their first term (of 28 years of 
protection) as of January 1, 1978). 
 103. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 104. Id. (quoting Exodus 20:15). 
 105. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 106. Id. at 398–99. 
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Thus, if you try to pull a stunt like Love, no matter how much it 
may constitute a labor of love, the potential consequences could be 
severe. First, under existing law, you will almost certainly be liable 
for infringement.107 Second, the penalties could be devastating. The 
Beatles works are, quite naturally, timely registered and eligible for 
enhanced remedies in the event of infringement: statutory damages 
of up to $150,000 per act of willful infringement108 (of which there 
would be at least 130 if one replicates the Love project) and recovery 
of reasonable attorneys’ fees.109 Consequently, even without causing 
any cognizable actual damage or making any actual profits from the 
unauthorized exploitation of The Beatles works, an individual trying 
to make her own version of Love could face damages in excess of $20 
million—$19,500,000110 plus fees and costs. Progress, even in the 
arts, has a price; but it needn’t be that high. 
The Beatles, of course, are not alone in dangling copyright’s 
Sword of Damocles over the heads of would-be appropriationists 
creating derivative works. Almost any book, periodical, recording, 
movie, television show, or computer program put out by a large 
press, magazine publisher, music label, film studio, broadcast 
network, or software developer enjoys similar protection, even 
though many such works may lack continued economic value.111 
 
 107. See supra notes 103–106 and accompanying text. 
 108. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012) (“In a case where the copyright owner sustains the 
burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in 
its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than 
$150,000.”). 
 109. Id. § 505 (providing that a court may “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the 
prevailing party” in an infringement suit). 
 110. $150,000 per act of infringement multiplied by 130 acts of infringement. See id. § 
504 (enabling copyright holders to seek recovery of statutory damages in the amount of up to 
$150,000 per willful act of infringement of a copyrighted work). 
 111. Courts possess wide, if not entirely unfettered, discretion in deciding where in the 
statute’s range a statutory damages award should fall and they need only be guided by their 
sense of justice. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 
(1952) (citing L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 106–07 (1919)) 
(noting that, for awarding statutory damages, “the court’s discretion and sense of justice are 
controlling”). Indeed, some circuits have suggested there need not be any relationship to 
actual harm in the assessment of statutory damages. See Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-
Rasset, Nos. 11–2820, 11–2858, 2012 WL 3930988, at *7 (8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2012) (“It 
makes no sense to consider the disparity between ‘actual harm’ and an award of statutory 
damages when statutory damages are designed precisely for instances where actual harm is 
difficult or impossible to calculate.”).  
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IV. THE ASSERTION OF RIGHTS 
It is not just in the vesting of rights where copyright’s regulatory 
regime exerts its broader social influence. Indeed, the process of 
rights assertion—which includes how and when rights are asserted 
and against whom they are enforceable—both reflects and impacts 
dominant discourses, social relationships, and struggles over cultural 
and political meaning. 
A. Guantanamo’s Greatest Hits: Music, Torture, and Copyright Law 
Consider the curious case of the use of music by the federal 
government at the American military base at Guantanamo Bay and 
the subsequent response by the recording industry, especially in light 
of its aggressive long-term campaign against unauthorized file 
sharing on the Internet. Shortly after taking office in 2009, President 
Barack Obama stated that he would bring to an end the use of 
Guantanamo Bay as a detention camp for enemy combatants in the 
war on terrorism.112 With the eventual close of the facility, a number 
of rather controversial policies would presumably come to an end. Of 
those policies, one of the more unusual was the military’s arguably 
infringing use of music on the prisoners.113 The soundtrack to 
Guantanamo Bay, it turns out, was replete with copyrighted songs 
meant to addle and unnerve, especially on repeat, but to which the 
government apparently possessed no rights to perform.114 
As a preliminary matter, the playlist at Guantanamo was filled 
with interesting choices. For example, it included “Fuck Your 
 
 112. See Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Sec’y of Def. and the Att’y 
Gen. (Dec. 15, 2009) (Presidential Memorandum – Closure of Detention Facilities at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/presidential-memorandum-closure-dentention-facilities-guantanamo-bay-naval-base; see 
also Ed Henry, Obama to Order Guantanamo Bay Prison Closed, CNN.COM (Jan. 12, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/12/obama.gitmo/. 
 113. See David Alexander, Performers Angry Their Music Used in Guantanamo 
Interrogations, REUTERS, Oct. 22, 2009, http://blogs.reuters.com/frontrow/2009/10/22/ 
performers-angry-their-music-used-in-guantanamo-interrogations/. 
 114. Cahal Milmo, Pop Stars Demand Details of Guantanamo Music ‘Torture’, 
INDEPENDENT, Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/pop-
stars-demand-details-of-guantanamo-music-torture-1807255.html (“Campaigners say there is 
evidence that music played repeatedly at ear-splitting levels was used to ‘humiliate, terrify, 
punish, disorient and deprive detainees of sleep’ as part of efforts to break detainees during 
interrogation. Former inmates at Guantanamo have previously testified that songs from 
AC/DC, Britney Spears, the Bee Gees and Sesame Street were played as part of a psychological 
onslaught.”). 
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God”115—a particularly bizarre selection considering the Bush 
Administration’s religiosity and the federal government’s position, 
through the Federal Communications Commission, on the use of 
indecent language in other contexts.116 Guantanamo Bay’s Top Ten 
List—the songs most frequently played to interrogate prisoners—
featured a perverse smorgasbord of heavy metal, noxious children’s 
music, and (seemingly) patriotic stadium rock: 
1. “Enter Sandman” – Metallica 
2. “Bodies” – Drowning Pool 
3. “Shoot to Thrill” – AC/DC 
4. “Hell’s Bells” – AC/DC 
5. “I Love You” (from the Barney and Friends children’s television 
show) 
6. “Born In The USA” – Bruce Springsteen 
7. “We Are The Champions” – Queen 
8. “Babylon” – David Gray 
9. “White America” – Eminem 
10. “Sesame Street” (theme from eponymous children’s television 
show)117 
Thankfully, the Cure’s “Killing an Arab” (no matter what its 
existentialist, Camusian roots) was not on the list. 
The music policy is, of course, not entirely new. In 1989, 
General Manuel Noriega, a reputed opera lover,118 was holed up in a 
Papal nunciature in Panama City, seeking refuge with the Vatican 
after American forces had invaded his country. In response, 
American military officials bombarded him incessantly with loud rock 
and pop, including such songs as “Nowhere to Run” and 
“Smugglers Blues.”119 In 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) and the FBI famously blared 
 
 115. Andy Worthington, A History of Music Torture in the “War on Terror”, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12, 2008, 12:12 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-
worthington/a-history-of-music-tortur_b_151109.html. 
 116. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioners at 17, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Fox Television 
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (No. 07-582), 2008 WL 2308909, at *17 (arguing that 
the FCC has broad authority to enforce the statutory prohibition on the broadcast of “any 
obscene, indecent or profane” language over the public airwaves). 
 117. Martyn McLaughlin, Rock Legends Want to Silence Guantanamo’s Torture Tunes, 
SCOTSMAN (Dec. 10, 2008, 9:05 PM), http://news.scotsman.com/topstories/Rock-legends-
want—to.4782083.jp. 
 118. George J. Church et al., Panama No Place to Run, TIME, Jan. 8, 1990. at 38. 
 119. Roberto Suro, Vatican Is Blaming U.S. for Impasse on Noriega’s Fate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 1989, at 1. 
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heavily distorted music and recordings of rabbits being slaughtered 
during the infamous stand-off with the Branch Davidians in Waco, 
Texas.120 The origins may go even further back than 1989 in Panama 
City. One military official, retired United States Air Force Lieutenant 
Colonel Dan Kuehl, located the policy’s spiritual genesis in the 
Bible: “Joshua’s army used horns to strike fear into the hearts of the 
people of Jericho. . . . His men might not have been able to break 
down literal walls with their trumpets, but the noise eroded the 
enemy’s courage,” he commented.121 
Politics aside and whatever its origins, the government’s music 
policy in Guantanamo raised a key copyright issue: It appeared that 
the government was not paying the appropriate public performance 
licenses needed to play the music.122 But, the response from artists 
concerning government use of copyrighted material overseas and 
without permission is mixed. For example, James Hetfield of 
Metallica appears to condone the military’s public performance use 
of his work in Fallujah: “If the Iraqis aren’t used to freedom, then 
I’m glad to be part of their exposure.”123 Hetfield did mention, 
however, that the government had neither asked his permission nor 
paid him royalties.124 Ironically, in other contexts, Metallica has 
claimed that the unauthorized use of a copyright holder’s works 
constitutes an inexcusable act of thievery.125 For example, the band 
has led the fight against unauthorized downloading of its music on 
the Internet.126 
Not all artists were so enthusiastic about the military’s 
unauthorized use of their music, however. As Trent Reznor of Nine 
Inch Nails wrote, “It’s difficult for me to imagine anything more 
profoundly insulting, demeaning and enraging than discovering 
 
 120. Michael Isikoff & Pierre Thomas Reno, FBI Took Fatal Gamble; Officials Believed 
Suicides Unlikely, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1993, at A1. 
 121. Clive Stafford Smith, Welcome to “the Disco,” GUARDIAN, (June 19, 2008), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jun/19/usa.guantanamo. 
 122. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (granting copyright holders to musical compositions the 
exclusive right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly” with “perform” being defined as 
“not only the initial rendition or showing, but also any further act by which that rendition or 
showing is transmitted or communicated to the public”). 
 123. Lane DeGregory, Iraq ‘n’ Roll, TAMPA BAY TIMES, (Nov. 21, 2004), 
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/21/Floridian/Iraq__n__roll.shtml. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Metallica v. Napster, No. C 00-4068 MHP, 2001 WL 777005 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 
2001) aff’d sub nom. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 126. Id. 
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music you’ve put your heart and soul into creating has been used for 
purposes of torture.”127 Reznor also threatened legal action: “If 
there are any legal options that can be realistically taken they will be 
aggressively pursued, with any potential monetary gains donated to 
human rights charities.”128 However, it appears that Reznor never 
followed up on this threat. In contraposition to Metallica, Reznor 
has served as a powerful voice opposing the Recording Industry 
Association of America (“RIAA”) lawsuits against unauthorized 
Internet downloading.129 
While a few individual artists have raised concerns about the 
apparent infringement, the industry itself has remained relatively 
silent. Although the RIAA appears to have no qualms about suing 
children and grandmothers for engaging in peer-to-peer file 
sharing,130 it does not seem as enthusiastic about pursuing 
infringement charges against the federal government, despite the 
brazen unauthorized public performance of the songs.131 
Admittedly, the infringement issue at Guantanamo does raise 
some complexities. The most immediate question that comes to 
mind is whether and how U.S. copyright law might apply in 
Guantanamo in the first place. After all, it is an axiomatic principal of 
American copyright law that it has no extraterritorial application.132 
And, as the Bush Administration maintained in constitutional 
challenges to its Guantanamo detention policy, the territory was not 
considered United States soil in any sense of the word.133 Specifically, 
the government claimed that it did not exert sovereignty over 
Guantanamo Bay, and, therefore, United States law did not apply 
there.134 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court rejected this 
 
 127. Nine Inch Nails Official Website, Regarding NIN Music Used at Guantanamo Bay 
for Torture, Forums (last visited Dec. 11, 2008), 
http://forum.nin.com/bb/read.php?9,302470. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Greg Sandoval, Take My Music, Please, CNET NEWS (Oct. 30, 2007, 4:12 PM), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9807934-7.html. 
 130. See Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, and Other Good Targets 
for the Recording Industry’s File Sharing Litigation, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 146 
(2006) (documenting the music industry’s peer-to-peer litigation campaign). 
 131. See Smith, supra note 121. 
 132. Phanesh Koneru, The Right “To Authorize” in U.S. Copyright Law: Questions of 
Contributory Infringement and Extraterritoriality, 37 IDEA 87, 89 (1996) (“The Copyright 
Act is presumed to have no extraterritorial application, which means that infringement 
occurring outside the United States is not actionable under the Act.”). 
 133. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 753 (2008). 
 134. Id. at 765 (“[T]he Government’s view is that the Constitution ha[s] no effect there, 
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argument in Boumediene v. Bush, finding that the United States had 
exerted de facto sovereignty through its “complete and  
 
 
uninterrupted” exercise of “absolute and indefinite” control over 
Guantanamo for almost a century.135 
Arguably, the federal Copyright Act applies in any territory over 
which the United States exerts sovereignty.136 However, to avoid any 
issue of ambiguity, most United States territories have an express 
statute that enables application of federal copyright laws.137 For 
example, the Copyright Act applies in the Panama Canal Zone 
through operation of section 391 of the Panama Canal Code, which 
provides that “[t]he patent, trade-mark, and copyright laws of the 
United States shall have the same force and effect in the Canal Zone 
as in continental United States, and the district court is given the 
same jurisdiction in actions arising under such laws as is exercised by 
United States district courts.”138 Guantanamo Bay does not appear 
to have such a provision in place. Thus, post-Boumediene, there is 
still some question about the application of American copyright 
protection in Guantanamo. 
However, one can potentially circumvent this problem in two 
ways. First, if a part of the infringing activity occurs in the United 
States (e.g., perhaps the recordings are selected in the United States 
for unauthorized public performance in Guantanamo Bay), parties in 
the United States who contributed to the infringing activity can be 
held liable under American copyright law.139 Second, if one 
 
at least as to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed sovereignty in the formal sense 
of the term” in its 1903 lease with Cuba.). 
 135. Id. at 727. 
 136. See, e.g., Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1167 (9th Cir. 
1996) (“United States copyright law applies to what takes place in the United States, [though] 
not to what takes place in Italy, Germany, or any other foreign places”). 
 137. See Borge Varmer, Study No. 34 Copyright in Territories and Possessions of the United 
States, in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: 
STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Comm. Print 1961) (noting how the U.S. Virgin 
Islands and Puerto Rico, among other territories, have such enabling acts). 
 138. C.Z. CODE tit. 3, § 391 (1934). 
 139. As Nimmer writes, “[I]f, and to the extent, a part of an ‘act’ of infringement occurs 
within the United States, then, although such act is completed in a foreign jurisdiction, those 
parties who contributed to the act within the United States may be rendered liable under 
American copyright law.” MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4-17 NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 17.02 (citing, inter alia, Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co., 24 
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distinguishes Boumediene and argues that the terms of the lease for 
Guantanamo between Cuba and the United States determine the 
issue, Cuba is the territorial sovereign and unauthorized performance 
would represent a violation of Cuban law.140 Given these facts, it is 
surprising that not a single one of the myriad “rockers” with a 
penchant for all things Che Guevara has reveled at the prospect of 
suing the United States government for infringement under Cuban 
copyright law. 
The lack of action by composers and record labels has effectively 
granted the federal government unfettered rights to take the works 
of various recording artists and cast them in unfamiliar lights and 
contexts, thereby lending some of these compositions’ meanings 
entirely at odds with the intentions of their authors. Consider Bruce 
Springsteen’s “Born in the U.S.A.”141 Through its bleak portrait of a 
Vietnam veteran forgotten by his own country, the song presents a 
poignant critique of societal inequities and our tragic failure to 
properly honor our most courageous individuals for their 
sacrifices.142 Played at Guantanamo Bay, however, the song takes on 
an entirely different significance—at least to its intended audience of 
soldiers and detainees.143 With the imprimatur of DJ Uncle Sam, the 
song’s seemingly jingoistic, anthemic chorus takes center stage. In 
the process, the tune transforms into a patriotic paean rather than a 
biting attack on the false promises of the American dream and it 
serves as an effective aural device to demarcate the insider-outsider 
(or American/non-terrorist versus non-American/terrorist) divide 
separating the soldiers and detainees. Indeed, a central distinction 
between detainees taken to Guantanamo Bay and held indefinitely 
without charges and those brought to the United States and entitled 
to full due process rights was initially based on a detainee’s 
 
F.3d 1088, 1094 n.9 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). 
 140. Cuban Copyright Law art. 4 (Act No. 14/1977), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=174839. 
 141. BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Born in the U.S.A., on BORN IN THE U.S.A. (Colombia 
Records 1984). 
 142. Id. (Columbia Records 1984) (“Come back home to the refinery/Hiring man says 
‘son if it was up to me’/Went down to see my V.A. man/He said ‘son don’t you understand 
now’. . . Down in the shadow of penitentiary/Out by the gas fires of the refinery/I’m ten 
years burning down the road/Nowhere to run ain’t got nowhere to go/Born in the U.S.A./I 
was born in the U.S.A./Born in the U.S.A./I’m a long gone daddy in the U.S.A.”). 
 143. Considering that some of the detainees may not speak English, one could argue that 
the message targets the soldiers as much as the detainees. 
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citizenship/birth status.144 If you were, indeed, lucky enough to be 
born in the U.S.A., you were entitled to fundamentally different 
rights than those who were not.145 Thus, besides setting a patriotic 
tone and asserting the base’s status as a distinctly American space, 
the blaring of the song over the Guantanamo loudspeakers also 
serves as a stark reminder to the detainees of how much the accidents 
of birth can affect one’s fate. 
All told, the unauthorized use of Springsteen’s “Born in the 
U.S.A.” allows the government to re-engineer the meaning of the 
song almost entirely, transforming it from an ironic and caustic 
critique of our societal failures to a bold assertion of national pride 
and prowess. And it is the absence of infringement litigation that 
enables this radical semiotic recasting of the work to take place. 
Indeed, at a time when the recording industry is suing individual 
users for millions of dollars for unauthorized peer-to-peer 
downloading—an effort supported by the federal government with 
legislation that has provided heightened statutory damages and 
increased criminal enforcement of copyright laws146—the recording 
industry has remained quiet about the federal government’s use of 
copyrighted recordings at Guantanamo Bay. And the federal 
government has shown no compunction about making such uses, 
regardless of the potential infringement.147 
B. The RIAA’s Litigation Campaign Against Online File Sharing 
The lack of enforcement against the federal government’s 
activities in Guantanamo stands in sharp contrast to the recording 
industry’s massive campaign against ordinary individuals who have 
 
 144. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding, inter alia, that 
detainees who are American citizens are entitled to challenge their detention before an 
impartial judge). 
 145. See, e.g., id. 
 146. See, e.g., Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 
1999, Pub. L. 106-160, 113 Stat. 1774 (providing for a sharp increase in the range for 
statutory damages awards under the Copyright Act); Examining U.S. Governmental 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 10-11 (2007) (statement of Kevin J. O’Connor, Chairman of the Department of 
Justice Task Force on Intellectual Property) (noting the federal government’s increasing 
commitment to enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Copyright Act). 
 147. The United States government has waived its sovereign immunity with respect to 
copyright infringement claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) (giving copyright holders the right to 
bring claims against the federal government in the Court of Federal Claims for acts of 
copyright infringement). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1264 
engaged in online file sharing. Individuals unlucky enough to come 
under the gaze of the content-creation industries have faced 
devastating monetary penalties and even jail time for their actions.148 
Doctoral candidate Joel Tenenbaum was famously on the receiving 
end of a bankrupting judgment in the amount of $645,000 in 
statutory damages for making thirty songs available for downloading 
on a peer-to-peer network.149 Jammie Thomas-Rasset, a single 
mother of four who earned her living working as a natural-resources 
coordinator for a Native American tribe in Minnesota, suffered a 
$1.92 million judgment after being found liable for making twenty-
four songs available for online file sharing.150 
Although such judgments seem staggering, Tenenbaum and 
Thomas-Rasset enjoyed relatively lenient treatment when compared 
to some others. Jack Yates, a twenty-eight-year-old who worked for a 
duplication company charged with making promotional copies of the 
Michael Myers movie The Love Guru, made the mistake of burning 
an unauthorized copy of the movie.151 This copy eventually made its 
way onto the Internet, where it was allegedly downloaded more than 
85,000 times.152 For his actions, the government charged Yates with 
criminal copyright infringement and sentenced him to six months in 
a federal prison.153 Kevin Cogill, a blogger who posted nine tracks 
from Guns N’ Roses’s long-awaited album, Chinese Democracy, on 
 
 148. For timely-registered works, infringers face statutory damages in the amount of up 
to $150,000 per willful act. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (“In a case where the copyright owner 
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, 
the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more 
than $150,000.”). In the digital age, these numbers can add up quickly. The Copyright Act 
also provides for criminal penalties, including up to five years imprisonment, for certain types 
of first offenses. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2319. 
 149. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 150. See Chandra Steele, 8 Ways Tech Could Throw You in Jail, Or Worse, PCMAG.COM 
(Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.pcmag.com/slideshow/story/294889/8-ways-tech-could-
throw-you-in-jail-or-worse/5; Chris Williams, Big Fine Could Be Big Trouble in Downloading 
Case, PHYSORG.COM (June 19, 2009), http://www.physorg.com/news164653697.html 
(noting that Tom Sydnor, the director of the Progress & Freedom Foundation’s Center for 
the Study of Digital Property, defended the verdict by arguing that “[l]egally acquiring a 
license to give copies of a song to potentially millions of Kazaa users might well have cost 
$80,000 per song” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 151. See Richard Lawson, How The Love Guru Could Cost You Half a Year of Your Life, 
GAWKER (June 19, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://gawker.com/5296843/how-the-love-guru-
could-cost-you-half-a-year-of-your-life. 
 152. See ‘Love Guru’ Costs Dumbass 6 Months of Freedom, TMZ (June 19, 2009, 9:15 
AM), http://www.tmz.com/2009/06/19/love-guru-costs-dumbass-6-months-of-freedom. 
 153. Id. 
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his website shortly before the songs’ release in 2008, saw police 
arrest him at gunpoint, for violating federal copyright law.154 Facing 
a potential five-year prison term and a $250,000 fine under federal 
law, he pled guilty to the charges and prosecutors sought a six-
month sentence.155 
So, while individuals have suffered back-breaking litigation for 
acts of online file sharing, the federal government has been fortunate 
enough to avoid enforcement for its unauthorized uses of music at 
Guantanamo. Meanwhile, state governments enjoy absolute 
immunity for copyright infringement.156 Indeed, despite attempts by 
Congress to dictate otherwise, states can make unauthorized use and 
abuse of copyrighted works with impunity and suffer no adverse legal 
consequences.157 
In short, the very acts from which the federal government has 
evaded enforcement and state governments continue to possess 
sovereign immunity can, and have, resulted in the economic 
destruction of individual lives. At the very least, the vast disparity in 
treatment for similar acts raises fundamental questions of equity. 
More pointedly, it reveals a broader and more systematic structuring 
of copyright law to support entrenched social, political, and 
economic interests, either at the expense of or in contraposition to 
treatment of the unsophisticated or less powerful. 
To be sure, patterns of enforcement have much to do with 
strategic considerations in achieving long-term profit maximization. 
For example, a movie studio may turn a blind eye to unauthorized 
fan fiction since suing one’s consumers can create bad press and 
developing an active fan fiction pool might ultimately inure to the 
benefit of the studio by generating increased interest in its franchise. 
But these decisions do not just have consequences for the potential 
litigants involved. In the aggregate, choices about the prosecution of 
intellectual-property rights may also have a broader impact on 
society. Take the enforcement decisions of the United States 
Olympic Committee (“USOC”) with respect to their most valuable 
piece of intellectual property—the term “Olympic.” While the 
USOC has no problem with an international, quadrennial 
 
 154. See David Kravets, Feds Demand Prison for Guns N’ Roses Uploader, WIRED (Mar. 
13, 2009, 4:37 PM), http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/03/feds-demand-6-m.html. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See supra note 43. 
 157. Id. 
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competition for athletes with disabilities (i.e., the Special Olympics) 
using the “Olympic” mark, it fought tooth and nail, and even won a 
Supreme Court victory, to prevent such a use by an international, 
quadrennial competition for athletes who are gay.158 This 
enforcement position does not simply impact the USOC, the Special 
Olympics and the Gay Games. Instead, it sends a powerful message 
about athletic competition and sexual orientation and effectively 
patrols which social groups enjoy semiotic access to our cultural 
heritage and which ones do not.159  
To explore these themes further, scholarship in other fields can 
provide inspiration and guidance. For example, First Amendment 
scholars have analyzed how the inherent subjectivity of obscenity law 
and its selective enforcement can lead to viewpoint discrimination 
and the silencing of subversive voices coming from marginalized 
groups.160 Criminal law theorists have analyzed the serious class and 
race implications of mass incarceration, the war on drugs, and the 
enforcement of narcotics law.161 Similarly, by examining patterns of 
 
 158. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547–48 
(1987) (affirming the right of the USOC to prevent the use of the term “Olympic” by an 
international, quadrennial competition for gay athletes); John Tehranian, Parchment, Pixels, & 
Personhood: User Rights and the IP (Identity Politics) of IP (Intellectual Property), 82 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2011) (describing the enforcement efforts of the USOC). 
 159. John Tehranian, supra note 158, at 51. (“But, when intellectual property laws begin 
to control the use of our language[,] . . . we risk creating a class of linguistic haves and have-
nots. . . . To see and consume the word ‘Olympic’ in association with a gay event helps 
attenuate residual prejudices about sport and sexual preference. It can imbue individuals with 
the sense that one’s sexual orientation is immaterial to one’s ability to attain athletic excellence, 
thereby impacting identity formation. At the same time, the ability to use the word ‘Olympics’ 
in association with a gay event sends a powerful expressive message about a particular 
community’s relationship with a broader international tradition. By restricting the use of 
linguistic tools such as basic words imbued with cultural meaning, we ultimately limit self-
definition and expression, the very hallmarks of personhood development. Intellectual-property 
laws therefore patrol insider-outsider boundaries within mainstream society, and perpetuate 
social hierarchy by artificially limiting the use of language by non-preferred groups.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of 
Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1565 (1988) (“[T]he suppression of 
pornography [enables] the state [to] certify and enforce a moral code that reinforces and 
justifies the political status quo.”); John Tehranian, Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller, 
and the Future of Public Discourse on the Internet, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 16–21 (2003) 
(arguing that, in practice, obscenity law has served “as a means to suppress ideas and prevent 
challenges to the dominant social and racial paradigm. . . . It is hardly a coincidence that ethnic 
and sexual minorities have been the most prominent targets of obscenity law enforcement in 
the United States over the past several years.”). 
 161. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 4 (2010) (arguing that the mass incarceration facilitated by 
our criminal justice system, including its drug laws, constitutes “a stunningly comprehensive 
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rights assertion in the aggregate, intellectual-property scholars can 
analyze the ways in which the regulation of cultural production and 
reproduction might cut along and against racial, gender, sexual 
orientation, class, and other social fault lines. 
V. THE ADJUDICATION OF RIGHTS: THE MODERN HIERARCHIES 
OF PROTECTION 
Finally, besides exerting its influence through the creation and 
assertion of rights, copyright law shapes societal structures and 
regulates individual behavior as part of a larger hegemonic project 
during the process of adjudicating rights. Privileging certain forms of 
cultural content creates a hierarchy of protection with broad social 
import. The hierarchies of protection effectively afforded in the 
adjudication of federal copyright law are constructed, inter alia, 
through seemingly innocuous procedures—such as the registration 
requirement162—and the ostensibly aesthetically neutral application 
of substantive rules—such as the fair-use doctrine or the idea–
expression dichotomy. The registration requirement can profoundly 
determine the rights given to a work. Meanwhile, the rhetoric of 
aesthetic neutrality is belied by aesthetic judgments that are imbued 
with cultural and political biases that inevitably determine the level of 
protection granted to copyright works. Thus, while the use (or lack 
thereof) of intellectual property can have a profound impact on 
personhood interests, access to intellectual property represents a tool 
for both the maintenance and perpetuation of hierarchy. Control of 
personhood is achieved through the control of intellectual property, 
as intellectual property becomes a key and instrumental force in any 
hegemonic identity project. 
First, consider how creative works are given differing levels of 
protection based on the formalities of our registration regime, which 
by its nature creates two classes of works: those by sophisticated 
 
and well-disguised system of racialized social control”); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of 
Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 22 (2012) (noting that 
“[w]hile scholars have long analyzed the connection between race and America’s criminal 
justice system, an emerging group of scholars and advocates has highlighted the issue with a 
provocative claim: They argue that our growing penal system, with its black tinge, constitutes 
nothing less than a new form of Jim Crow”); Roseanne Scotti & Steven Kronenberg, 
Foreword, Symposium: U.S. Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow?, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. 
REV. 303, 303 (2001) (noting the emerging literature examining the “disparate impact and 
enforcement of [drug] laws and policies on minority communities”). 
 162. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2012). 
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creators and those by unsophisticated creators. Works by 
sophisticated creators, which are timely-registered, are virtually 
inviolable. Their sacralization is ensured through a combination of 
potentially draconian penalties, including sizable statutory 
damages,163 the awarding of attorneys’ fees,164 and even criminal 
sanctions165—as the examples above recount. But, contrary to 
conventional wisdom, works by unsophisticated creators, which are 
usually not timely registered, enjoy little protection and infringed 
creators are left with little practical means to vindicate their rights 
through litigation.166 As it turns out, because their works can often 
be used without authorization and with impunity with few adverse 
consequences, unsophisticated creators in the United States are 
surprisingly far worse off than equivalent creators in many countries 
in the world. 
Second, besides the formalities of registration, hierarchies of 
protection are effectuated through judicial decision-making. 
Specifically, in applying copyright doctrine, courts regularly make 
decisions based on implicit, and even explicit, aesthetic judgments—
judgments that are inevitably imbued with cultural and political 
biases, thereby impacting user rights and personhood interests and 
maintaining and perpetuating social order and existing hierarchies. 
A. Highbrow/Lowbrow Redux: Copyright Registration and the 
Sacrilization of Cultural Production 
Despite our rhetoric of strong authorial protection, the 
formalities of our copyright regime and enforcement reveal a more 
complex system at operation. Not every author or copyright holder 
enjoys extensive protection. Just as late nineteenth century America 
witnessed the emergence of cultural hierarchy with the development 
of the highbrow/lowbrow divide and concomitant norms to ensure 
preservation of the distinction,167 late twentieth century America has 
witnessed the emergence of cultural hierarchy from the development 
of two types of works—the privileged and the poorly protected. The 
social loci of these two types of works are mediated by copyright law 
and its technicalities. In short, the rise of mass consumer culture has 
 
 163. Id. § 504(c). 
 164. Id. § 505. 
 165. Id. § 506. 
 166. See infra, Part V.A. 
 167. See supra Part III.B. 
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diminished the importance of the highbrow/lowbrow norms that 
governed the sanctity of work in the late nineteenth century. 
However, the stratification of cultural property continues. The divide 
between high and low culture—a hierarchy of creative works—has 
re-emerged. But, instead of being driven by norms, it is now 
patrolled by law. Specifically, in the late twentieth century and 
beyond, levels of protection are governed by the status of creators 
and a single, unique feature of American copyright law: the timely 
registration requirement.168 
Under the reigning 1976 Copyright Act, recovery of statutory 
damages and attorneys’ fees are only available to a certain class of 
copyright holders: those who register their works with the United 
States Copyright Office in a timely manner in relation to the 
infringement.169 As 17 U.S.C. § 412 provides, 
no award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees . . . shall be 
made for . . . any infringement of copyright commenced after first 
publication of the work and before the effective date of its 
registration, unless such registration is made within three months 
after the first publication of the work.170 
Registration, especially timely registration, therefore represents a 
pivotal feature on the copyright landscape. Without it, a plaintiff’s 
remedies are limited to nothing more than actual damages—a 
potential recovery that typically renders infringement litigation 
quixotic.171 
Thus, with the use of formalities, the 1976 Copyright Act has 
 
 168. 17 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 (2012). 
 169. This makes the United States different than any other major country. Elsewhere, full 
legal vindication of one’s exclusive rights does not require the added procedure of registration, 
let alone timely registration. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT § 17.03 (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 2012) (“[U]nlike the United States copyright 
law, under virtually all foreign copyright laws there are no administrative formalities that must 
be satisfied in order to create or to perfect a copyright.”). 
 170. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012). 
 171. Without statutory damages or attorneys’ fees, recovery is limited to lost sales or 
disgorgement of the infringer’s profits. Not surprisingly, the amount of these damages is often 
riddled with ambiguity. Moreover, unless the infringed work is world-renowned, the damages 
claim will rarely amount to more than a few thousand dollars. But pursuing an infringement 
suit will cost a plaintiff several hundred thousand dollars in attorneys’ fees. And although the 
plaintiff might receive an injunction to prevent further infringement, it will be costly to obtain, 
especially given that the significant fees the plaintiff would have to incur are not recoupable. 
Thus, even under the most optimistic scenario, legal action will infrequently be worth 
pursuing, unless a plaintiff has a desire to fight for principal at his or her own peril. For a more 
detailed discussion, see Tehranian, supra note 77, at 1416–21. 
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actually created two distinct tiers of effective protection for 
copyrighted works. Sophisticated, regular creators (generally 
corporations in the content-creation industries) timely register their 
works. They therefore enjoy generous remedies against infringers, 
including the recovery of reasonable attorneys’ fees and the 
assessment of statutory damages—which can rise to the draconian 
rate of up to $150,000 per willful act of infringement.172 Absent any 
proof of actual damages, such plaintiffs can elect statutory damages 
that quickly create the possibility of a multimillion-dollar judgment 
in their favor.173 By sharp contrast, unsophisticated creators 
(generally individual creators and artists) rarely timely register their 
works. As a result, they are often left with little except moral force to 
enforce their intellectual-property rights. By operation of copyright 
law’s technicalities, they are denied the ability to recover attorneys’ 
fees or statutory damages,174 even if the defendants’ infringing 
conduct continues after registration.175 They can collect only actual 
damages, which are both difficult to prove and often of limited 
value.176 In short, they are left without adequate mechanisms to 
vindicate the exclusive rights purportedly granted through the 
Copyright Act. The dichotomy between sophisticated and  
 
unsophisticated creators has replaced the highbrow/lowbrow divide 
in patrolling the sanctity of copyrighted works. 
Of course, the idea that access to legal counsel and adherence to 
certain legal formalities can improve the effective scope of one’s 
 
 172. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
 173. See supra notes 148–155 and accompanying text. 
 174. 17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2012). 
 175. Under Section 412 of the Copyright Act, statutory damages and attorneys’ fees are 
not generally available if the registration occurs after the infringement. Further, for the 
purposes of determining the availability of statutory damages and fees, courts have almost 
uniformly determined that the date of infringement is the date of the first infringement by the 
defendant. See Johnson v. Jones, 149 F.3d 494, 506 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[I]nfringement 
‘commences’ for the purposes of § 412 when the first act in a series of acts constituting 
continuing infringement occurs.”); accord Derek Andrew, Inc. v. Poof Apparel Corp., 528 
F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the first act of infringement in a series of 
ongoing infringements of the same kind marks the commencement of one continuing 
infringement under [§] 412”); Bouchat v. Bon-Ton Dep’t Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 315, 330 
(4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2054 (2008); Troll Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., 483 F.3d 
150, 158 (2d Cir. 2007); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 142–44 (5th Cir. 
1992). As one disgruntled copyright claimant put it, this judicial interpretation grants 
infringers a veritable “license to steal.” Teevee Toons, Inc. v. Overture Records, 501 F. Supp. 
2d 964, 966 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
 176. See supra note 171. 
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rights is certainly not novel or surprising. But, the consequences in 
copyright law are particularly dramatic, virtually determining the 
rights to and in cultural production. Sophisticated, economically 
powerful interests receive full protection for their creative works, 
essentially making their cultural production sacred and inviolable. 
The act of cultural reproduction that Bourdieu found so essential to 
the hegemonic project177 is, therefore, controlled and patrolled by 
copyright law—with the hallowed works of elites subject to use and 
re-use only with proper authorization and payment. Meanwhile, the 
output of the rest of society does not receive such beatification. For 
unsophisticated players, their production becomes fodder for remix, 
reinterpretation, and re-commercialization, all without authorization 
or payment. Thus, while the law purports to grant copyright 
protection to any work of authorship with minimal creativity fixed in 
a tangible medium, whether made by Manet or the Man on the 
Street, that is not the case. All works and creators are not treated 
alike, and the formalities of the registration requirement establish a 
hierarchy of more protected and less protected works, the 
untouchable and the readily malleable. The resulting gestalt enables 
dominant social forces to usurp freely (both metaphorically and 
literally) the creative content of the masses for their own use while 
simultaneously enjoying the ability to prevent any unauthorized use 
of their privileged creative content. Within the confines of this 
regime, it is the underclass that typically ends up with minimal 
protection: an obscure blues musician whose riffs and melodies are 
appropriated by a major music label’s next big thing; a graffiti artist 
from the urban corridors whose renderings eventually make their 
way into the works of the modern art world’s latest sensation; an 
unheralded rural landscape painter whose evocative depictions of 
nature are used without authorization or payment by a major retailer 
to set the mood for their western-themed sales catalog; and a 
struggling dance choreographer, whose uniquely sequenced moves 
land in the new music video for a leading pop star. In the absence of 
timely registration, none of these individuals qualify for the recovery 
of statutory damages or attorneys’ fees if they should sue and prevail 
in a claim of copyright infringement.178 Since there are also no 
 
 177. See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text. 
 178. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2012). In fact, plaintiffs that have not timely registered their 
copyrights can never receive their attorneys’ fees, even if they easily prevail in litigation. See id. 
Ironically, defendants can always recover their fees in a copyright suit, a scenario that creates a 
one-way risk of attorneys’ fees recovery for a plaintiff seeking to vindicate its rights without a 
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punitive damages available in copyright law, would-be infringers 
have little to no disincentive to make unauthorized and 
uncompensated use of creative works not timely registered.179 In the 
end, therefore, these relatively ‘unsophisticated’ copyright holders 
will find themselves holding what one court has aptly characterized 
as “a right without a remedy.”180 
All the while, bankrupting penalties face those who would touch 
the copyrighted works of the modern music industry, the major 
Hollywood studios, the elite art world, or the fashion industry 
without permission, even when these are built on the unprotected 
works of others. Thus, the registration system plays a critical role in 
perpetuating a sacrilization process that began with the development 
of highbrow/lowbrow norms in the late nineteenth century and 
eventually became embodied in the law through the expansion of the 
copyright monopoly and the development of the derivative rights 
doctrine. While the emergence of mass reproduction and digital 
dissemination has threatened the consecration of privileged works, 
our registration regime has rekindled the aura. What technology has 
undermined, our two-tiered copyright hierarchy has reinstated, at 
least in part. Consequently, by controlling the manipulation and 
transformation of cultural content through its hierarchical system of 
protection, copyright law’s registration requirement plays a 
significant role in mediating identity formation, regulating social 
networks, and controlling expressive rights as it determines the ways 
in which we can and cannot interact with the seminal semiotic 
signposts of our civilization. 
B. Aesthetic Judgment as Hegemonic Project 
1. The myth of aesthetic neutrality 
Besides copyright’s procedural rules, its seemingly innocuous and 
neutral substantive provisions also regulate the bodily integrity of 
sacred and privileged texts, patrol cultural reproduction, and impact 
 
timely registration. See Tehranian, supra note 77, at 1414–15. 
 179. As Judge Posner has noted, “there is no basis in the law for requiring the infringer 
to give up more than his gain when it exceeds the copyright owners’ loss. Such a requirement 
would add a punitive as distinct from a restitutionary element to copyright damages, and . . . 
the statute contains no provision for punitive damages.” Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & 
Co., 329 F.3d 923, 931–32 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 180. See Bus. Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 
1989) (citing 3 NIMMER § 14.02[A] at 14-14) (depicting such a circumstance). 
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identity development in the service of dominant social forces. At a 
rhetorical level, courts have historically maintained a steadfast 
commitment to aesthetic neutrality in their copyright jurisprudence. 
Consider Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s enduring and 
foundational admonition enunciated in the 1903 Bleistein case.181 
Cautioning judges to expurgate aesthetic judgments from the 
courtroom, Holmes, writing for the majority of a divided Supreme 
Court, found no reason to deny copyright protection to an 
advertisement featuring renderings of circus performers, despite its 
prosaic commerciality.182 Rejecting the view of the defendants and 
the lower courts, Holmes asserted that the perceived aesthetic value 
of a work could not and should not determine its copyrightability.183 
In theory, therefore, a commercial copy would receive the same 
protection as high art. Reasoned Holmes in his most classic 
formulation: “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons 
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most 
obvious limits.”184 
On the surface, judges have heeded Holmes’s advice, and the 
rhetoric of aesthetic neutrality is a dominant trope in modern 
copyright jurisprudence. Notes Robert Gorman, “It is indeed the 
rare judge who purports to assess, in explicit terms, whether the art, 
literature or music before it is good or bad.”185 One need look no 
further than the emphatic language of the Seventh Circuit: “[J]udges 
can make fools of themselves pronouncing on aesthetic matters.”186 
Yet for all this rhetorical solicitude, courts inevitably make 
aesthetic judgments when approaching copyright cases. In his 
groundbreaking work on the subject, Alfred Yen argues that the 
palaver of aesthetic neutrality has belied the common judicial practice 
of assessing aesthetic factors in deciding fundamental issues of 
copyright law.187 To illustrate this point, Yen examines seminal 
 
 181. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 182. Id. at 251. 
 183. As Holmes argued, “That these pictures had their worth and their success is 
sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs’ rights.” Id. 
at 252. 
 184. Id. at 251. 
 185. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 
25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2001). 
 186. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 187. Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 
266–97 (1998). 
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jurisprudence on issues of originality, the useful arts doctrine, and 
substantial similarity.188 At a certain level, copyright hermeneutics 
necessarily implicate aesthetic considerations. For example, the 
Constitution’s Copyright Clause—which appears to limit copyright 
protection to the extent that it promotes “the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts”189—virtually demands such “aesthetic 
determinations.”190 In addition, judges have introduced aesthetic 
considerations into the copyright calculus by determining what types 
of unauthorized uses (e.g., parody versus satire) are productive or 
transformative for the purposes of the first factor of the fair-use 
defense.191 Construing conceptual severability for the purposes of 
distinguishing between works of applied art, which receive copyright 
protection, and works of industrial design, which do not, also 
inevitably involves aesthetic judgments about what constitutes art 
and what defines the proper relationship between form and function 
needed to secure legal protection. All told, as Robert Gorman 
comments, “it is not at all rare to find courts addressing the 
question, ‘what is art?’ And it is quite common to find copyright 
courts assessing—sometimes covertly, sometimes openly—whether a 
work has merit, worth or social value.”192 
 
The consequences of such aesthetic adjudications are far 
reaching. As Yen argues, they inextricably affect the type of works 
we, as a society, receive from our artists.193 After all, economically 
motivated artists might “prefer creating works that meet the 
aesthetic preference of judges because other works would either not 
get the benefits of copyright protection or wind up being 
suppressed.”194 Even more fundamentally, however, aesthetic 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 190. Gorman, supra note 185, at 2. 
 191. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1525, 1559 n.137 (2004) (“Whether ‘productive’ or ‘transformative’ use guides the first 
fair use factor, either inquiry threatens to trap courts and litigants into making the kinds of 
aesthetic judgments that the copyright system expressly disclaims.”); Gorman, supra note 185, 
at 14–16; see also Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1156–58, 1163 (holding that a 
politician’s unauthorized use of musical compositions during a campaign constituted “satire,” 
rather than “parody,” and, therefore, did not qualify for a fair-use defense as it did not 
adequately comment upon or criticize the direct content of songs). 
 192. Gorman, supra note 185, at 2. 
 193. Yen, supra note 187, at 248–49. 
 194. Id. 
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judgments can serve to both maintain and preserve existing power 
structures. The seemingly neutral laws of copyright, therefore, have 
the potential to create a hierarchy of culture that serves hegemonic 
interests. 
Consider the way in which application of the fair-use doctrine, in 
combination with other copyright principles, has violated ostensible 
norms of aesthetic neutrality in deciding which works will remain 
consecrated and hallowed and which works will not. With a narrow 
reading of fair use, a court can protect a work from remix, 
reinterpretation, and unauthorized mutilation. In short, it can 
preserve a work’s aura, inviolability, and canonic status and promote 
its economic value to its rights holder. With a broader reading of fair 
use, a court can open the floodgates for the work’s use and abuse. 
Indeed, if the time has come for a work to be metaphorically rejected 
from the modern canon, there is perhaps no more defining moment 
than when that work loses its strong copyright protection in court. A 
careful exegesis of copyright jurisprudence reveals that aesthetic 
decisions, driven by implicit cultural and political considerations, can 
dramatically affect the fair-use calculus, making fair use a 
determination on which cultural works are the “fairest of them all.” 
To illustrate this point, it is instructive to compare the results of 
two recent high-profile copyright infringement suits involving 
canonical literary works, unauthorized derivatives, and claims of fair 
use. The first suit involved Alice Randall’s The Wind Done Gone, an 
unauthorized follow-up to Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the Wind. 
The second suit involved John David California’s 60 Years Later, an 
unauthorized send-up of J.D. Salinger’s Catcher in the Rye. 
2. The consecration done gone: The de-canonization of Gone with the 
Wind and the battle to depict the antebellum South. 
In the first suit, Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the Estate of 
Margaret Mitchell sued to enjoin publication of Alice Randall’s The 
Wind Done Gone, on the grounds that it constituted an 
unauthorized derivative work based on Gone with the Wind.195 The 
main conceit of Randall’s novel was its recasting of the Gone with the 
Wind story and world from the point of view of the African 
American slaves and mulattos rather than the white aristocrats. In 
 
 195. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (Suntrust I), 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. 
Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’d and remanded, 268 F.3d 1257 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
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Randall’s work, Ashley Wilkes is gay, interracial sexual relationships 
are discussed, and the travails of daily life for the victims of the 
South’s rigid and racist social hierarchy are vividly depicted.196 
A district court initially enjoined publication of The Wind Done 
Gone, accepting the Mitchell Estate’s contention that it constituted 
an infringing work and rejecting Randall’s fair-use defense.197 
Specifically, the trial judge found that The Wind Done Gone was a 
sequel and not a parody, and therefore not the type of transformative 
use granted fair-use protection.198 The tenor of the judge’s opinion is 
particularly revealing. It begins by immediately emphasizing Gone 
with the Wind’s place in the cultural canon and its commercial 
significance—both noting its “widespread acclaim” and its impressive 
sales in the “tens of millions.”199 These facts are, of course, largely 
irrelevant to any aesthetically neutral analysis of infringement and fair 
use. But, they set the tone for the court’s opinion, which reflects a 
strong deference to the work’s favored aesthetic status—its presumed 
import and cultural and economic value.200 
The existing body of fair-use precedent supports the proposition 
that parodic works can generally enjoy exemption from infringement 
liability.201 The key portion of the trial court’s decision therefore 
comes when it characterizes The Wind Done Gone as not primarily a 
parody but, rather, a sequel or some other form of unauthorized 
derivative work.202 While acknowledging that the book has 
numerous parodic elements, the court somehow divines that “the 
book’s overall purpose is to create a sequel to the older work and 
provide Ms. Randall’s social commentary on the antebellum 
South.”203 The court’s attempt to segregate the parodic elements of 
the work from the sequel-like elements is difficult to understand 
when the two concepts are not at all mutually exclusive and, quite 
often, intertwined. For example, Mel Brooks’s classic Spaceballs is, in 
some senses, both an unauthorized sequel to and parody of Star 
Wars. Indeed, the dialectic that casts parody in opposition to sequel 
 
 196. See generally ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001). 
 197. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1385–86. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1363. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding “that 
parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use”). 
 202. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1385. 
 203. Id. at 1378. 
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is, at its core, an aesthetic judgment. As a parody, the work is 
presumed to be transformative and, consequently, entitled to fair use 
protection for its contribution to progress in the arts.204 As a sequel, 
the work is seen as nothing more than an effort to free ride on the 
copyrighted work of another. In this sense, the Suntrust court ends 
up conflating its analysis of commercialism with its analysis of 
transformative use, later concluding that “the purpose of putting the 
key characters of Gone with the Wind in new settings is to entertain 
and sell books to an active and ready-made market for the next Gone 
with the Wind sequel.”205 To the court, Randall is nothing more than 
a leech sucking economic value away from Mitchell’s genius. But, at 
some level, all parodies can be portrayed as such. After all, they all 
rely upon the original and its status as a recognized work to a certain 
audience. 
As it turns out, a careful parsing of the court’s decision reveals 
that this conclusion stems from aesthetic judgments about the 
inviolability of Gone with the Wind. As the court tautologically posits, 
“If the defendant is permitted to publish The Wind Done Gone, an 
unauthorized derivative work, then anyone could tell the love story 
of Gone with the Wind from another point of view and/or create 
sequels or prequels populated by Ms. Mitchell’s copyrighted 
characters without compensation to the Mitchell Trusts.”206 With 
these words, the court presupposes that the latter result simply 
cannot occur (despite the existence of the fair-use doctrine that 
plainly creates no such hard-and-fast rule). Put another way, the 
court assumes, and thereby ensures, that the work must remain 
inviolate. As a sacred text, Gone with the Wind should be protected 
from unauthorized individuals telling the story from a different point 
of view. 
Consecration is at the heart of the court’s concern because a 
world where the sacred text has been defiled is unimaginable: “[B]y 
killing two core characters from Gone with the Wind and marrying off 
 
 204. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (“From the infancy of copyright protection, some 
opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill 
copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts . . . .’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
 205. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1373; id. at 1379 (“The court finds that The Wind 
Done Gone is unquestionably a fictional work that has an overarching economic purpose. . . . 
[T]he commercial purpose of The Wind Done Gone weighs strongly in favor of the plaintiff on 
the first factor . . . .”). 
 206. Id. at 1382. 
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another, The Wind Done Gone has the immediate effect of damaging 
or even precluding the Mitchell Trusts’ ability to continue to tell the 
love story of Scarlett and Rhett.”207 Read literally, the court’s 
admonition fails to distinguish between real life—where an 
individual’s death typically precludes the possibility of resurrection—
and fiction—where no such limitations exist. The statement not only 
reflects a startling failure of imagination by the court—doubtlessly 
provoked by the inability to envision the bastardization of the 
consecrated work—but also does not hold weight empirically. For 
example, the Star Trek franchise has continued to thrive in telling 
the stories of Captain Kirk, Mr. Spock, and the U.S.S. Enterprise, 
despite the fact that both Kirk208 and Spock209 were killed at various 
points during the authorized movies. Moreover, audiences can 
readily discern between authorized and unauthorized sequels of a 
franchise and, if they cannot, that is something that the federal 
Lanham Act could help police through its prohibition of unfair 
competition and false advertising. 
Of course, the Scarlett and Rhett characters do not die just 
because Randall says they do. But, what the court really fears is that 
The Wind Done Gone will sound not the literal death knell for the 
characters, but for Gone with the Wind’s untouchability. Stripped of 
unadulterated idealization, the work and its characters can no longer 
survive in the exact form they once possessed. Thus, it is not whether 
the work is parody or sequel that truly appears to drive the court’s 
decision; it is destruction of the work’s romanticism—a romanticism 
that is grounded in a distinctly whitewashed vision of the antebellum 
South that painfully ignores the harsh realities of life for that 
society’s underclass. Thus, the court’s read on copyright law, driven 
by aesthetic judgments, has an impact on the discourse about what is 
perhaps the most famous and popular vision of Southern life during 
the years of slavery. With the district court’s opinion, copyright law is 
used to preserve a hegemonic vision of the South that has historically 
prevailed in the American consciousness. 
By sharp contrast, the Eleventh Circuit found that The Wind 
 
 207. Id. 
 208. WILLIAM SHATNER & DAVID FISHER, UP TILL NOW 287 (2008) (“Well. Kirk may 
have been dead in the movies, but there was no reason he had to be dead in the publishing 
industry. I sold my treatment to Simon & Schuster and Star Trek: The Return became a best-
selling novel.”). 
 209. ROSS S. KRAEMER, WILLIAM CASSIDY & SUSAN L. SCHWARTZ, RELIGIONS OF STAR 
TREK 161 (2003). 
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Done Gone could enjoy fair-use and First Amendment protection and 
reversed the district court’s injunction.210 Despite its differing logic, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion was similarly influenced by 
aesthetic judgments.211 To the Eleventh Circuit, criticism, ridicule, 
and even scorn for a work serves as a social good that trumps any 
harm it may do to a copyright holder’s economic rights.212 Citing 
the Ninth Circuit’s Fisher case that immunized When Sonny Sniffs 
Glue from liability as a parody of When Sunny Gets Blue, the court’s 
concurring opinion by Judge Marcus asserts that “[d]estructive 
parodies play an important role in social and literary criticism and 
thus merit protection even though they may discourage or discredit 
an original author.”213 Works are not to be treated as sacred cows 
and the preservation of immutability does not serve public interests. 
“Because the social good is served by increasing the supply of 
criticism—and thus, potentially, of truth,” posits the court, “creators 
of original works cannot be given the power to block the 
dissemination of critical derivative works.”214 
 
In particular, the Eleventh Circuit found Gone with the Wind 
especially ripe for deconstruction. And this becomes a critical point 
when considering identity interests and how the copyright holders 
may draw on intellectual-property rights as a means to preserve and 
maintain existing power structures, visions of inclusion and 
exclusion, and critical historical narratives. The Eleventh Circuit 
specifically singles out the Mitchell Estate’s control of prior 
authorized derivative works and its desire to limit certain themes as a 
basis for, rather than against, its ruling.215 By sharp contrast to the 
district court, which sought to retain the aesthetic integrity of 
Mitchell’s saccharine depiction of Dixie and protect it from 
unwanted mutilation,216 the appeals court viewed Mitchell’s work as 
one ripe for, if not outright in need of, deconstruction.217 In the 
 
 210. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. (Suntrust II), 268 F.3d 1257, 1276–77 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
 211. See id. at 1271. 
 212. Id. at 1276–77. 
 213. Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th 
Cir. 1986)). 
 214. Id. (quoting Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 115 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 1998)). 
 215. Id. at 1274–75 (majority opinion). 
 216. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1386. 
 217. See Suntrust II, 268 F.3d at 1270, 1276–77 (stating that Randall’s work 
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majority decision, the court points out that the Mitchell Estate was 
particularly horrified at the idea that the Gone with the Wind milieu 
might be adulterated with references to homosexuality.218 The 
concurrence goes even further, taking pains to reference the Mitchell 
Estate’s particular concern with the depiction of interracial and same-
sex relationships.219 Indeed, the concurring opinion quotes the 
Mitchell Estate as having told a potential writer for the authorized 
sequel for Gone with the Wind, “You’re not going to like this, but 
the estate will require you to sign a pledge that says you will under 
no circumstances write anything about miscegenation or 
homosexuality.”220 Ultimately, therefore, Randall’s right to 
transform “Ashley Wilkes into a homosexual” and to “depict[] . . . 
interracial sex, and . . . multiple mulatto characters”221 strongly 
informed the court’s decision to strike the injunction preventing 
publication of The Wind Done Gone. 
 
All told, the struggle over the scope of the Gone with the Wind 
copyright becomes a struggle over the right to present an alternate 
vision of Old Dixie, using the familiar terrain of the romanticized 
antebellum South to bring long-suppressed issues of race, class, and 
even sexual orientation to the forefront of the story. In the end, the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the preliminary injunction enjoining 
publication of The Wind Done Gone constituted “an unconstitutional 
prior restraint”222—not just of free speech broadly speaking, but of 
the right to challenge the idealized notions of the Old South that 
have historically resided in the national subconscious precisely 
because of such works as Gone with the Wind. To the Eleventh 
Circuit, the time had come to de-canonize Gone with the Wind and 
end its inviolability.223 And the decision to do so stemmed from 
 
“explode[s] the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and after the Civil 
War” in Gone with the Wind, including the novel’s suggestion that “blacks and whites were 
purportedly better off in the days of slavery”). 
 218. Id. at 1270 n.26 (noting “special relevance” in the fact that Suntrust, the trustee of 
the Mitchell Trust, “makes a practice of requiring authors of its licensed derivatives to make no 
references to homosexuality”). 
 219. Id. at 1282 (Marcus, J., concurring). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at 1259 (majority opinion). 
 223. Id. at 1283 (Marcus, J., concurring) (“The law grants copyright holders a powerful 
monopoly in their expressive works. It should not also afford them windfall damages for the 
publication of the sorts of works that they themselves would never publish, or worse, grant 
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aesthetic judgments supporting the subversive power of Randall’s 
broadside in novel form.224 Painfully out of sync with more modern 
views, Gone with the Wind had to face the fact that the time to lose 
its consecrated status had come. 
3. 60 Years Later: J.D. Salinger and the Preservation of the Canon 
Indeed, a revealing contrast emerges when one considers the 
ultimate outcome of The Wind Done Gone suit—which effectively 
excommunicated Gone with the Wind from the category of sacred 
text—to the more recent controversy involving an unauthorized 
send-up of The Catcher in the Rye. Entitled 60 Years Later: Coming 
Through the Rye and purportedly authored by one John David 
California,225 the fanciful reverse postmodern bildungsroman features 
Holden Caulfield, now a seventy-six-year-old on the run from a 
nursing home, confronting his creator, J.D. Salinger himself.226 In 
2009, J.D. Salinger came out of hiding, at least legally speaking, to 
seek an injunction restraining publication of 60 Years Later on the 
grounds that it constituted a blatant infringement of his copyright.227 
The defendant objected, claiming fair-use and First Amendment 
protection.228 
The district court issued an injunction to enjoin the publication 
and distribution of 60 Years Later after finding Salinger was likely to 
prevail on the merits of the case.229 On appeal, the Second Circuit 
affirmed that part of the holding.230 A central part of the decision 
 
them a power of indirect censorship.”). 
 224. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is also significant in another light. What the district 
court saw as property—an interest in the preservation and consecration of something over 
which the Mitchell Trusts was said to possess dominion—the appeal court saw as speech. This 
is an aesthetic judgment as to the nature of a copyrighted work—whether it is simply a piece of 
private property, outside of the scope of the First Amendment, or whether it constitutes a form 
of speech, subject to First Amendment protection. 
 225. John David California is the pseudonym of author Fredrik Colting. Salinger v. 
Colting (Salinger I), 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
 226. See id. at 254 (granting injunction enjoining the sale of 60 Years After as an 
unauthorized derivative work based on Catcher in the Rye, regardless of the originality of 
contributions by the author of 60 Years After). 
 227. Id. at 253–54. 
 228. Id. at 254–55. 
 229. Id. at 254. 
 230. Salinger v. Colting (Salinger II), 607 F.3d 68 (2d. Cir. 2010) (affirming the district 
court’s finding that Salinger was likely to prevail on the merits of the case but remanding the 
case for full consideration of the factors from eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
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came when the court distinguished the suit involving The Wind Done 
Gone.231 Specifically, the court explained that, while the Suntrust case 
determined that The Wind Done Gone was a parody entitled to a 
likely fair-use defense, 60 Years Later was more characteristic of a 
sequel than a parody.232 Yet The Wind Done Gone’s purported status 
as a parody, sequel, or both is wrought with complexity. And, at a 
minimum, it was a close call—with the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Georgia ruling one way and the 
Eleventh Circuit ruling the other.233 
Moreover, there were several key facts that actually should have 
given 60 Years Later a better fair-use defense than The Wind Done 
Gone. First, with respect to the fourth (and most important, 
according to some courts) fair-use factor—market harm—The Wind 
Done Gone was certainly more damaging to the Mitchell Estate’s 
economic interests than 60 Years Later was to Salinger’s. Specifically, 
the Mitchell Estate had actually demonstrated a clear interest in 
entering the market to create derivative works based on Gone with 
the Wind.234 In 1991, they authorized publication of a sequel 
entitled Scarlett: The Sequel to Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the 
Wind.235 And, at the time of the Suntrust case, they had entered into 
a contract authorizing a possible second sequel.236 Indeed, St. 
Martin’s Press had paid dearly for the privilege of publishing the 
latter—to the tune of seven figures.237 By sharp contrast, whatever 
the moral offense to Salinger, the publication of 60 Years Later did 
not raise the same specter of economic harm as did the publication 
of The Wind Done Gone.238 After all, Salinger was a notorious recluse 
who had refused to publish anything for the past half century.239 He 
never betrayed any interest in publishing a sequel to Catcher in the 
Rye. 60 Years Later is therefore highly unlikely to dilute a derivative 
 
388 (2006) before the injunction issues). 
 231. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 257–58. 
 232. Id. at 257–58, 260 n.3. 
 233. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga. 2001) vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 
(11th Cir. 2001) and rev’d and remanded, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 234. Id. at 1363. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1374 n.12. 
 238. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (noting that Salinger “has not demonstrated any 
interest in publishing a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher”). 
 239. See PAUL ALEXANDER, SALINGER: A BIOGRAPHY 26 (2000) (explaining that 
Salinger became and was famously a recluse). 
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market in which Salinger had no desire whatsoever to participate. 
Admittedly, the jurisprudence applying the market harm test has 
suggested that harm to potential markets is enough for a plaintiff to 
prevail on this element of the fair-use test.240 The Salinger court 
noted as much: 
[A]lthough Salinger has not demonstrated any interest in 
publishing a sequel or other derivative work of Catcher, the Second 
Circuit has previously emphasized that it is the “potential market” 
for the copyrighted work and its derivatives that must be examined, 
even if the “author has disavowed any intention to publish them 
during his lifetime,” given that an author “has the right to change 
his mind” and is “entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his 
[derivative works].”241 
But, potential must at least be plausible and, at the end of the 
day, it is utterly disingenuous to read Salinger’s suit as an attempt to 
preserve his right to change his mind should he decide to enter the 
market for derivative works. 
Secondly, large parts of The Wind Done Gone actually retold the 
story from Gone with the Wind,242 thereby engaging in more actual 
borrowing, both literal and structural, than 60 Years Later did from 
the Catcher in the Rye. The Wind Done Gone even appropriated 
entire sentence structures from the original work. As an example, the 
first page of The Wind Done Gone states, “She was not beautiful, but 
men seldom recognized this, caught up in the cloud of commotion 
and scent in which she moved,” while Gone with the Wind begins, 
“Scarlett O’Hara was not beautiful, but men seldom realized it when 
caught by her charm . . . .”243 60 Years Later certainly used the 
Holden Caulfield of Catcher in the Rye, but its literal borrowing was 
largely limited to the use of certain (common and non-protectable) 
catchphrases or idioms related to the Caulfield character.244 In fact, 
 
 240. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–146 
(2d Cir. 1998) (finding that the fourth factor of fair use favors the plaintiff even where it has 
“evidenced little if any interest in exploiting this market for derivative works”); J.D. Salinger v. 
Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 241. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d. at 268 (internal citation omitted) (quoting J.D. 
Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 242. See Richard Schur, The Wind Done Gone Controversy: American Studies, Copyright 
Law, and the Imaginary Domain, 44 AM. STUD. 5, 6 (2003). 
 243. Suntrust I, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (quoting ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE 
GONE 1 (Houghton Mifflin) (2001); MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND 1 
(Macmillan) (1936)). 
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the Salinger ruling was notable as it represented the first time that a 
court in the Second Circuit had found that copyright protection 
extended to a single character who had appeared in a single novel.245 
Nevertheless, while The Wind Done Gone ultimately received a 
favorable finding on fair use, 60 Years Later was enjoined from 
publication.246 And aesthetic judgments on the relative value of 
unauthorized derivative works appear to have made a key difference 
in court’s decision to issue the injunction. Consider the only 
mention that the Salinger court makes of the overarching goals of 
the copyright system. Seeking to reconcile its ruling with copyright’s 
role in promoting progress in the arts, the Salinger court reasoned 
that “some artists may be further incentivized to create original 
works due to the availability of the right not to produce any 
sequels.”247 As a first matter, the court’s speculation on this point 
strains all credulity. But regardless of how one feels about the bizarre 
conjecture that the right not to produce sequels can incentivize 
creation, it is clear that the court’s statement rests on a tacit aesthetic 
judgment: that it is better to preserve (ex post) the incentive to 
create The Catcher in the Rye than it is to stimulate the creation of 
unauthorized sequels. The calculus here is fairly remarkable: the 
court chooses to enjoin definitely the publication of unauthorized 
derivatives—works that could contribute to progress in the arts—on 
the chance, based at least in part on idle speculation, that some artists 
may create more because they can rest secure in the knowledge that 
no one can create sequels of their works. The hierarchy at play is 
simple: the original work implicitly trumps the sequel(s) and/or 
derivatives, especially those of the unauthorized variety. Certainly, 
for every Godfather II and Return of the Jedi, there are dozens of 
Blues Brothers 2000’s. But in deciding the fate of The Wind Done 
Gone, the Eleventh Circuit certainly did not seem bothered by this 
possibility, as it adopted a radically different aesthetic judgment of 
the unauthorized derivative. At a more subconscious level, in the 
context of our times, it perhaps feels less wrong to allow someone to 
 
catchphrases as “‘phony,’ ‘crumby,’ ‘lousy,’ ‘hell,’ and ‘bastard’”). 
 245. Of course, while Holden Caulfield appeared in only one book, his character did 
appear in two published short stories, see J.D. Salinger, I’m Crazy, COLLIERS MAGAZINE (Dec. 
22, 1945); J.D. Salinger, Slight Rebellion Off Madison, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 21, 1946), 
and his family appeared in at least one other, see J.D. Salinger, Last Day of the Last Furlough, 
SATURDAY EVENING POST (July 15, 1944). 
 246. Salinger I, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 254. 
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skewer the dated artistic vision of Margaret Mitchell than to permit 
the bastardization of the revered masterworks of The Beatles or the 
adulteration of J.D. Salinger’s beloved Holden Caulfield. 
In the end, the decision to open up Gone with the Wind to The 
Wind Done Gone effectively freed the literary property—and, more 
generally, the popular interpretation of a critical era in our nation’s 
history—to different narratives and perspectives. Thus, the battle 
over copyright protection can often become a clash between the 
hegemonic power of cultural reproduction and subversive effects of 
semiotic disobedience.248 Through both procedural rules and 
substantive doctrines, our intellectual-property laws can use 
registration requirements and aesthetic judgments to achieve 
something much broader than merely “progress of the arts.” Instead, 
by consecrating meaning and value, patrolling cultural hierarchy, and 
regulating the signposts of our society, intellectual property 
transcends its small corner of the legal universe and plays a 
fundamental role in shaping social structures and regulating 
individual behavior as part of a broader hegemonic project. 
C. Private Intellectual-Property Regimes and the Control of the Public 
Domain 
The ability to control meaning and interpretation of significant 
cultural content is not solely a function of copyright as a public law. 
As we saw earlier with our example of the emergence of the 
highbrow/lowbrow dichotomy in the late nineteenth century,249 
social norms grounded in quasi-copyright can play a central role in 
this process. In addition, adjudication through private ordering 
regimes, existing wholly outside of (or even in circumvention of) the 
federal copyright regime, can also enable the exercise of such 
control. 
Take the private intellectual-property regime that governs movie 
titles in Hollywood. Historically, public law has provided few 
protections to film titles. Titles are not registered by the Copyright 
Office and courts have repeatedly refused to grant them copyright 
 
 248. Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 493–96 (2007) 
(Borrowing terminology from John Fiske, Sonia Katyal refers to “semiotic disobedience” as the 
act of “alter[ing] existing intellectual property by interrupting, appropriating, and then 
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 249. See supra, Part III.B. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1286 
protection on the grounds that they inherently lack sufficient 
originality to warrant protection.250 Meanwhile, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and the courts have generally limited 
to franchises trademark protection for titles.251 In response, 
Hollywood has established a private law regime—the Title 
Registration Bureau—to fill this apparent gap. Operating relatively 
unchanged since its establishment in 1925, the Bureau functions 
under the auspices of the Motion Picture Association of America 
(“MPAA”) (originally known as the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America) and seeks to prevent unnecessary confusion 
in the marketplace between similarly titled movies.252 But the system 
has a powerful secondary effect: it entitles the holders of certain titles 
to privileged positions for the dissemination of their particular takes 
on famous works. This is particularly troubling when those works are 
in the public domain under federal copyright law and, in theory, 
useable by anyone. 
Although subscription to the Title Registration system is 
ostensibly voluntary, all six major studios are members, as are 
hundreds of independent studios.253 In addition, any subsidiaries of 
subscribing companies are also bound by the terms of the Title 
Registration Agreement.254 Under the Title Registration system, 
signatories to the Agreement are allowed, among other things, to 
reserve scores of titles to non-original works—even those in the 
public domain—on a first-come, first-serve basis.255 As such, various 
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REGISTRATION OF AND DISPUTES RELATING TO UNITED STATES THEATRICAL MOTION 
PICTURE TITLES (2005). 
 253. See Frequently Asked Questions, MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., 
http://www.mpaa.org/faq (last visited, Sept. 5, 2012). 
 254. TITLE REGISTRATION BUREAU, supra note 252, § 2.2.2. 
 255. Id. at § 4.4.3.1 (“The duration of protection for titles in the Public Domain Work 
Release category of the Released Film Index shall be . . . the same as a Permanent Original 
Release, if a Subscriber decides to claim permanent protection . . . . During the applicable 
period of protection, no identical Original Work Title or Public Domain Work Title shall be 
registered.”); Id. at § 4.4.1.1. (“The duration of protection for all titles in the Permanent 
Copyright Release category of the Released Index shall be permanent, unless the title is 
withdrawn but subject to the registration of an identical Copyrighted Work Title or an 
identical Public Domain Work Title as may be provided for in these Rules. Permanent 
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studios have long-term exclusionary rights to the titles of virtually 
every work in our cultural canon—even though many such works 
were published prior to 1923 and no longer enjoy copyright 
protection. If someone else uses a title that is even confusingly 
similar to a registered public domain work during the relevant time 
period, the studio that has reserved the title can challenge the use, 
and the issue is decided by arbitration through the MPAA.256 Under 
the system, therefore, the particular studio that has reserved the 
name “Hamlet” can ensure that it is the only major studio that can 
release a feature film under that title for either a twenty-five or 
twelve year window.257 While anyone is free to make a movie version 
of Shakespeare’s play Hamlet, only one studio can effectively release 
a movie entitled Hamlet or, in practical terms, gain widespread 
distribution of a movie entitled Hamlet for an entire generation of 
viewers. Of course, another studio might be able to release their 
interpretation of Hamlet under the name The Prince of Denmark, 
but this version will always be at inherent disadvantage to the studio 
that can actually use the real title of the (public domain) work. 
Since the MPAA’s Title Registration system is a private ordering 
regime, it is presumably immune from the constitutional and 
doctrinal limitations on copyright law that protect the public 
interest. But it impacts the public by playing a role in whose vision of 
Hamlet, or any other famous work, makes it to the big screen at 
theaters across the country. To do the definitive Romeo and Juliet or 
20,000 Leagues Under the Sea in movie form, one must obtain 
permission from, or work through, the studio that holds the right to 
the title. While these works technically remain in the public domain, 
they retain protection under Hollywood’s internal Title Registration 
system. Thus, the exertion of control over cultural content is not 
simply a function of federal copyright law, but also of private 
ordering regimes that create quasi-intellectual-property rights and do 
so with broader societal implications. 
 
protection means indefinite protection rather than for the term of copyright protection under 
applicable federal or state law.”) Although the system originally gave each studio the right to a 
maximum of 250 reserved names, the creation of subsidiaries has rendered this limitation moot 
and, in effect, each major has reserved thousands of titles. 
 256. Id. 
 257. The twenty-year window applies to original films released before September 1, 2000 
and the twelve-year window applies to original films released after September 1, 2000. See E-
mail from Mitch Schwartz, Vice President & Dir., Title Registration Bureau, Motion Picture 
Ass’n of Am. (Aug. 2, 2012) (on file with editors). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Norms, public laws, and private ordering regimes that regulate 
the use of intellectual property control the reproduction and 
manipulation of cultural content in ways that can both serve and 
subvert knowledge–power systems. A developing field of inquiry, 
which this Article refers to as critical intellectual-property 
scholarship, has begun to analyze this process in action. This Article 
has examined the common origins of this body of literature and built 
upon the extant scholarship by identifying three critical moments—
the vesting of rights, the assertion of rights and the adjudication of 
rights—where the broader social consequences of intellectual 
property are felt.  
Focusing specifically on copyright law, we first examined how the 
vesting of rights can interface with Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of 
cultural reproduction. We traced the gradual ascent of Shakespeare 
and opera from the realm of popular entertainment to elite culture in 
the late nineteenth century. In the process, we witnessed how 
changing norms and the creation of the derivative-rights doctrine 
within copyright law have aided the consecration and preservation of 
cultural production, a mechanism illustrated in the modern context 
through a comparison of the Love project to the Grey Album.  
We then turned our attention to the assertion of rights and saw 
how decisions in the enforcement of copyright have broader semiotic 
and social consequences. We examined the federal government’s 
unauthorized use of music, such as Bruce Springsteen’s “Born in the 
U.S.A.,” at the American detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay and 
the RIAA’s high profile litigation campaign against illicit, online file 
sharing. In the process, we illustrated how enforcement efforts (or 
the lack thereof) can service the hegemonic recasting of cultural 
meaning and how disparate assertion techniques can support 
entrenched social, political, or economic interests. 
Finally, we examined how the implementation of copyright’s 
procedural and substantive doctrines in the adjudicative process can 
maintain and perpetuate cultural hierarchy. Copyright’s seemingly 
innocuous registration requirement dramatically illustrates this point 
by privileging certain forms of creative production in a manner that 
cuts along class lines. Meanwhile, the use of aesthetic considerations 
in juridical responses to send-ups of two American classics—Gone 
with the Wind and The Catcher in the Rye—demonstrates how 
doctrinal interpretation can turn on implicit value judgments about 
broader cultural, social, and political issues.  
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All told, copyright law represents a key situs in the battle for 
social control among sovereigns and their subjects, corporations and 
individuals, and entrenched interest groups and young upstarts. And, 
in the course of analyzing the ways in which authorial rights are 
vested, asserted, and adjudicated, we have explored how the 
contours of our copyright regime influence subordination practices 
by manufacturing cultural hierarchy and regulating acts of semiotic 
disobedience. Lying at the heart of discursive struggles over 
inculcation and meaning, copyright law has dramatic consequences 
for the shaping of social structures and the regulation of individual 
behavior. This Article ideally represents a helpful step in the 
development of a critical literature that examines the broader impact 
of intellectual-property rights on social relations and knowledge–
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